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Abstract. In this paper we study the zero-sum and nonzero-sum differential games with not
assuming Isaacs condition. Along with the partition π of the time interval [0, T ], we choose the
suitable random non-anticipative strategy with delay to study our differential games with asymmet-
ric information. Using Fenchel transformation, we prove that the limits of the upper value function
W π and lower value function V π coincide when the mesh of partition π tends to 0. Moreover,
we give a characterization for the Nash equilibrium payoff (NEP, for short) of our nonzero-sum
differential games without Isaacs condition, then we prove the existence of the NEP of our games.
Finally, by considering all the strategies along with all partitions, we give a new characterization
for the value of our zero-sum differential game with asymmetric information under some equivalent
Isaacs condition.
Keywords. Zero-sum and nonzero-sum differential game, asymmetric information, Isaacs condi-
tion, Nash equilibrium payoffs, Fenchel transformation.
1 Introduction
Zero-sum stochastic differential games have developed rapidly since the pioneering work [8] by
Fleming and Souganidis after they firstly introduced the Isaacs condition and characterized the
value of these games as a viscosity solution of some Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs equation. Hamade`ne
and Lepeltier in [9] characterized the value of zero-sum stochastic differential game as a solution
of some backward stochastic differential equation (BSDE, for short) under the equivalent Isaacs
condition. Cardaliaguet in [5] studied the zero-sum differential game with asymmetric information
under the Isaacs condition and characterized the value of this game as a dual solution of some
Hamilton-Jacobi equation.
On the other hand, nonzero-sum differential games with Isaacs condition have been studied
by many authors. When playing “control against control”, Hamade`ne, Lepeltier and Peng in
§Corresponding author.
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[10] characterized the Nash equilibrium point for nonzero-sum stochastic differential games as the
solution of some BSDE. Then Buckdahn, Cardaliaguet and Rainer in [1] gave a new definition of
Nash equilibrium payoffs (NEP, for short) and characterized this NEP, then they obtained the NEP
through a approximated method with playing “strategy against strategy”. Rainer in [12] compared
the two approaches used in [1] and [10] for nonzero-sum stochastic differential game and obtained
that the two definitions of Nash equilibrium payoffs coincide when they both exist. Lin in [11]
generalized the result of [1] into the case with the nonlinear payoffs.
Recently, some authors (such as, Buckdahn, Li, Quincampoix, etc., in [3], [4] and [6]) tried to
investigate the zero-sum stochastic differential games without the Isaacs condition. In [3] and [4],
the authors considered the zero-sum differential games and zero-sum stochastic differential games,
respectively, with symmetric information and without Isaacs condition by using a suitable notion
of mixed strategies and proved the existence of the value of these games. Buckdahn, Quincampoix,
Rainer and Xu in [6] generalized the case without Isaacs condition into the zero-sum differential
games with asymmetric information. All these papers ([3], [4] and [6]) used the strategy along
the partition π of the time interval [0, T ] and showed that the upper and lower value function
W π, V π defined along the partition π coincide as the mesh of π tends to 0. Although they have
proved the upper and lower value function W π, V π converge to the same function U when |π| (the
mesh of π) tends to 0, one may want to know the characterization for this value U . For this, we
try to give a characterization for the value U in Section 5. Inspired by the above papers without
Isaacs condition, we want to study the NEP for the non-zero sum differential games without Isaacs
condition in Section 4.
More details, we consider the following dynamics:
Xs = x+
∫ s
t
f(Xr, ur, vr)dr, s ∈ [t, T ], (1.1)
where u and v are stochastic processes taking value in compact U and V , respectively, f : Rn ×
U × V 7→ Rn is bounded, Lipschitz in x, uniformly in (u, v). For any fixed partition π of time
interval [0, T ], we give a generalized defintion of non-anticipative strategy with delay along this
partition π (see, Def. 2.1) which has the property that: for any partitions π1 and π2 with“π1 ⊂ π2”
(the partition points of π2 contain all of the partition points of π1), it holds the strategy set
Aπ1(t, T ) ⊂ Aπ2(t, T ) for Player I; similarly, we have that for Player II. Along with the partition
π, we define the upper and lower value functions W π(t, x, p, q) and V π(t, x, p, q) (more details see
Section 2) for our zero-sum differential game with asymmetric.
In Section 3, we firstly show that the upper and lower value function W π and V π defined by
the strategy from Aπ(t, T ) and Bπ(t, T ) are just the upper and lower value function W π1 and V π1
defined by the strategy from Aπ1 (t, T ) and Bπ1 (t, T ) which is the subset of Aπ(t, T ) and Bπ(t, T ),
respectively. Then, with the help of Fenchel transform, we prove a sub-dynamic programming
principle (sub-DPP, for short) for the conjugate functions of W π and V π, then we show that W π
and V π converge to the same function U as the mesh of π tends to 0 without Isaacs condition.
Moreover, this value U can be characterized as the unique dual viscosity solution of the following
Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs equation{
∂V
∂t
(t, x) +H(x,DV (t, x)) = 0, (t, x) ∈ [0, T ] × Rn,
V (T, x) =
∑
i,j piqjgij(x), (p, q) ∈ ∆(I)×∆(J),
(1.2)
where H(x, ξ) = infµ∈P(U) supν∈P(V )
( ∫
U×V f(x, u, v)µ(du)ν(dv) · ξ
)
.
In Section 4, we mainly consider the nonzero-sum differential game with symmetric information
(i.e., I = J = 1) and without Isaac condition. Inspired by the definition of NEP used in [1], we
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introduce a new definition of NEP for our nonzero-sum differential games. Using the value function
U that we find in Section 3, we show a characterization for our NEP. Furthermore, we prove the
existence of the NEP for our nonzero-sum differential games without Isaacs condition using this
characterization.
In Section 5, we give a characterization for the value function U (found in Section 3) of our zero-
sum differential games with asymmetric information. With the property that Aπ1(t, T ) ⊂ Aπ2(t, T )
if “π1 ⊂ π2”, we can consider the strategies in A(t, T ) where A(t, T ) is the union of the Aπ(t, T )
with all the partitions π for Player I, similarly that for Player II. Then we show that the upper
and lower value functionW (t, x, p, q), V (t, x, p, q) defined by the strategies from A(t, T ) and B(t, T )
coincide with the value function U(t, x, p, q) which is the unique dual viscosity solution of Hamilton-
Jacobi-Isaac equation (1.2) under some equivalent Isaacs condition. Therefore, we also provide a
new numerical method for calculating the value of the zero-sum differential game with asymmetric
information. At last, we give an example to illustrate that the equivalent Isaacs condition is
necessary.
Our paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we give some introduction about the dynamic
and the strategies for our games. Section 3 is devoted to proving the existence of the value of our
zero-sum differential game with asymmetric information and without Isaacs condition. In Section
4 we prove the existence of the Nash equilibrium payoffs of our nonzero-sum differential game with
symmetric information and without Isaacs condition. Finally, we give a characterization for the
value of the zero-sum differential games under some equivalent Isaacs condition in Section 5.
2 Preliminaries
Let (Ω,F , P ) be the canonical Wiener space, that is, Ω is the set of continuous functions from [0, T ]
to R2, F is the completed σ-algebra on Ω, P is the Wiener measure. We define the canonical process
Bt(ω) = (B
1
t (ω), B
2
t (ω)) = (ω1(t), ω2(t)), t ∈ [0, T ], ω = (ω1, ω2) ∈ Ω. Then B is a 2-dimensional
Brownian motion on (Ω,F , P ) and B1 is independent of B2. We denote by {Ft,s, s ≥ t} the
filtration generated by the Brownian motion B, where Ft,s = σ{Br − Bt, r ∈ [t, s]} ∨ N , N is the
set of null-set of P .
For any given partition π = {0 = t0 < t1 < · · · < tN = T} of the interval [0, T ], we define random
variables ζπi,j = Φ0,1(
Bitj
−Bitj−1√
tj−tj−1 ), i = 1, 2, j = 1, 2, . . . , N , where Φ0,1(x) =
1√
2π
∫ x
−∞ exp{−y
2
2 }dy,
x ∈ R. Obviously, {ζπi,j}1≤j≤N, i = 1, 2, is a family of independent random variables with uniform
distribution on [0, 1]. Let U and V be the compact metric spaces which are the control state
spaces used by Player I and II, respectively. Let P(U) and P(V ) be the space of all probability
measures over U and V , respectively. From Skorohod’s Representation Theorem, P(U) (resp.,
P(V )) coincides with the set of the distributions of all U -valued (resp., V -valued) random variables.
Now we introduce the admissible controls for both players.
For any t ∈ [0, T ], the U -valued and Lebesgue measurable functions (us)s∈[t,T ] form the set of
admissible controls for Player I, the V -valued and Lebesgue measurable functions (vs)s∈[t,T ] that
for Player II. We denote by Ut,T the set of admissible controls (us)s∈[t,T ] for Player I and by Vt,T
the set of admissible controls (vs)s∈[t,T ] for Player II.
For any given t ∈ [0, T ], x ∈ Rn, we consider the following ordinary differential equation
Xs = x+
∫ s
t
f(Xr, ur, vr)dr, s ∈ [t, T ], (2.1)
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where u ∈ Ut,T and v ∈ Vt,T , and the coefficient f : Rn × U × V 7→ Rn is supposed to be bounded,
continuous with respect to (u, v) and Lipschitz continuous in x, uniformly with respect to u and
v. Therefore, equation (2.1) has a unique solution and we denote it by Xt,x,u,v. From standard
estimates we obtain that there exists a constant C > 0 such that, for all (t, x), (t′, x′) ∈ [0, T ]×Rn,
for all s ∈ [t ∨ t′, T ],
(1) |Xt,x,u,vs − x| ≤ C(s− t),
(2) |Xt,x,u,vs −Xt
′,x′,u,v
s | ≤ C(|t− t′|+ |x− x′|).
(2.2)
The cost functionals of the zero-sum differential games are defined by the I × J functionals
gij(X
t,x,u,v
T ), i = 1, 2, . . . , I, j = 1, 2, . . . , J , where the mappings gij : R
n 7→ R are Lipschitz
continuous and bounded. Player I wants to minimize gij(X
t,x,u,v
T ), i.e., it is a cost functional for
him/her, while Player II wants to maximize gij(X
t,x,u,v
T ) a payoff for him/her. The cost functionals
of nonzero-sum differential games are defined in Section 5.
The rules for our zero-sum differential game with asymmetric information are as follows:
(1) At the beginning of the game, a pair (i, j) is chosen randomly with the probability (p, q) ∈
∆(I) ×∆(J), where ∆(I) is the set of probabilities p = (pi)i=1,...,I on {1, . . . , I} and
∑I
i=1 pi = 1;
∆(J) is defined similarly. Both players know the probability (p, q).
(2) The choice of i is only communicated with Player I, while the choice of j is only communicated
with Player II. But both players observe their opponent’s controls.
Generally speaking, differential games with “control against control” don’t admit a dynamic
programming principle and the value does, in general, not exist. Thus, we study the game of the
type “nonanticipative strategy with delay against nonanticipative strategy with delay”. Considering
the asymmetry of the information, the players want to hide a part of their private information. For
this they randomize their strategies, and the kind of randomization we choose is the key to obtain
a value for our zero-sum game in a framework without Isaacs condition.
Let we consider an arbitrarily given partition π = {0 = t0 < t1 < . . . < tN = T} and assume
t ∈ [tk−1, tk). We give the definition of random non-anticipative strategies with delay for a game
over the time interval [t, T ].
Definition 2.1. A random non-anticipative strategy with delay (NAD, for short) along the partition
π for Player I is a mapping α : Ω× [t, T ]× Vt,T 7→ Ut,T of the form
α(ω, v)(s) = αk(ω, ζ
π
1,k−1(ω), v)(s)I[t,tk)(s) +
N∑
l=k+1
αl(ω, (ζ
π
k−1, . . . , ζ
π
l−2, ζ
π
1,l−1)(ω), v)(s)I[tl−1 ,tl)(s),
where ζπl = (ζ
π
1,l, ζ
π
2,l), k− 1 ≤ l ≤ N − 2, and for k ≤ l ≤ N , the αl : Ω×R2(l−k)+1 × [t∨ tl−1, tl]×
Vt,T 7→ Ut,T , are F0,tk−2 ⊗B(R2(l−k)+1)⊗B([t ∨ tl−1, tl])⊗B(Vt,T )-measurable functions satisfying:
For all v, v′ ∈ Vt,T , it holds that, whenever v = v′ a.e. on [t, tl−1], we have for all ω ∈ Ω, for all
x ∈ R2(l−k)+1, αl(ω, x, v)(s) = αl(ω, x, v′)(s), a.e. on [t ∨ tl−1, tl], k + 1 ≤ l ≤ N .
Similarly, a random NAD strategy along the partition π for Player II is a mapping β : Ω ×
[t, T ]× Ut,T 7→ Vt,T of the form
β(ω, u)(s) = βk(ω, ζ
π
2,k−1(ω), v)(s)I[t,tk)(s) +
N∑
l=k+1
βl(ω, (ζ
π
k−1, . . . , ζ
π
l−2, ζ
π
2,l−1)(ω), v)(s)I[tl−1 ,tl)(s),
where ζπl = (ζ
π
1,l, ζ
π
2,l), k− 1 ≤ l ≤ N − 2, and for k ≤ l ≤ N , the βl : Ω×R2(l−k)+1 × [t ∨ tl−1, tl]×
Ut,T 7→ Vt,T , are F0,tk−2 ⊗B(R2(l−k)+1)⊗B([t ∨ tl−1, tl])⊗B(Ut,T )-measurable functions satisfying:
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For all u, u′ ∈ Ut,T , it holds that, whenever u = u′ a.e. on [t, tl−1], we have for all ω ∈ Ω, for all
x ∈ R2(l−k)+1, βl(ω, x, u)(s) = βl(ω, x, u′)(s), a.e. on [t ∨ tl−1, tl], k + 1 ≤ l ≤ N .
The set of all such random NAD strategies for Player I along the partition π is denoted by
Aπ(t, T ), and similarly Bπ(t, T ) is that for Player II, Aπ0 (t, T ) and Bπ0 (t, T ) are the sets of pure (i.e.
deterministic) strategies for player I and II. Then, we know for any partitions π, π′ of interval [t, T ]
with π ⊂ π′, it holds Aπ(t, T ) ⊂ Aπ′(t, T ). Moreover we define
A(t, T ) :=
⋃
π
Aπ(t, T ), B(t, T ) :=
⋃
π
Bπ(t, T ). (2.3)
Definition 2.2. We say that α ∈ Aπ1 (t, T ), if the mapping α : Ω× [t, T ]×Vt,T 7→ Ut,T has the form
α(ω, v)(s) = αk(ζ
π
1,k−1(ω), v)(s)I[t,tk)(s) +
N∑
l=k+1
αl((ζ
π
k−1, . . . , ζ
π
l−2, ζ
π
1,l−1)(ω), v)(s)I[tl−1 ,tl)(s),
where ζπl = (ζ
π
1,l, ζ
π
2,l), k − 1 ≤ l ≤ N − 2, and for k ≤ l ≤ N , the αl : R2(l−k)+1 × [t ∨ tl−1, tl] ×
Vt,T 7→ Ut,T , are B(R2(l−k)+1) ⊗ B([t ∨ tl−1, tl]) ⊗ B(Vt,T )-measurable functions satisfying: For
all v, v′ ∈ Vt,T , it holds that, whenever v = v′ a.e. on [t, tl−1], we have for all x ∈ R2(l−k)+1,
αl(x, v)(s) = αl(x, v
′)(s), a.e. on [t ∨ tl−1, tl], k + 1 ≤ l ≤ N . Similarly, we have β ∈ Bπ1 (t, T ).
Obviously, from the Definition 2.1 and 2.2 we know Aπ0 (t, T ) ⊂ Aπ1 (t, T ) ⊂ Aπ(t, T ), Bπ0 (t, T ) ⊂
Bπ1 (t, T ) ⊂ Bπ(t, T ).
From the definition of a NAD strategy, we get the following lemma which is crucial throughout
the paper. Such a result was established the first time by Buckdahn, Cardaliaguet and Rainer [1],
Lemma 2.4.
Lemma 2.1. For any α ∈ A(t, T ) and β ∈ B(t, T ), there exists a unique measurable mapping
Ω ∋ ω 7→ (uω, vω) ∈ Ut,T × Vt,T , such that, for all ω ∈ Ω,
α(ω, vω) = uω, β(ω, uω) = vω, a.e. on [t, T ].
A proof of Lemma 2.1 for a similar context can be found in [6]. However, since our framework
is slightly more general, for the reader’s convenience we prefer to give it here.
Proof. For any α ∈ A(t, T ), from (2.3) we know there exist a partition π1 of interval [0, T ], such
that α ∈ Aπ1(t, T ). Similarly, there exist a partition π2 of interval [0, T ], such that β ∈ Bπ2(t, T ).
Define π = π1∪π2 which combines π1 and π2, and notice that then α ∈ Aπ(t, T ), and β ∈ Bπ(t, T ).
Indeed, if, for example, π = {0 = t0 < t1 < · · · < tN = T} and tl−1, tl+1 ∈ π1, but
tl /∈ π1, then for [tl−1, tl+1] as j-th subinterval of the partition π1, ζπ1i,j = Φ0,1(
Bitl+1
−Bitl−1√
tl+1−tl−1 ) =
Φ0,1
(
1√
tl+1−tl−1
(√
tl − tl−1Φ−10,1(Φ0,1(
Bitl
−Bitl−1√
tl−tl−1 ))+
√
tl+1 − tlΦ−10,1(Φ0,1(
Bitl+1
−Bitl√
tl+1−tl )
))
, i.e., ζπ1i,j is a mea-
surable function of (ζπi,l, ζ
π
i,l+1), i = 1, 2. The above situation can be extended into an obvious manner
to the general case π1 ⊂ π and allows to show that Aπ1(t, T ) ⊂ Aπ(t, T ).
Assume π = {0 = t0 < t1 < . . . < tN = T}, and t ∈ [tk−1, tk), 0 ≤ k ≤ N . For each ω ∈ Ω,
α(ω, v) (respectively, β(ω, u)) restricted to [t, tk] depends only on v ∈ Vt,T (respectively, u ∈ Ut,T )
restricted to [t, tk−1]. Since [t, tk−1] is empty or a singleton, from the property of delay we know
α(ω, v), β(ω, u) restricted to [t, tk] do not depend on v and u. Then we can define u
1
ω = α(ω, v
0),
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v1ω = β(ω, u
0), for any v0 ∈ Vt,T and u0 ∈ Ut,T , and the mapping Ω ∋ ω 7→ (u1ω, v1ω) ∈ Ut,T × Vt,T is
measurable. Then we have
α(ω, v1) = u1, β(ω, u1) = v1 a.e. on [t, tk].
Now we assume that for j ≥ 2, α(ω, vj−1ω ) = uj−1ω , β(ω, uj−1ω ) = vj−1ω , a.e. on [t, tj+k−2], and
ω 7→ (uj−1ω , vj−1ω ) is measurable.
Then we define ujω = α(ω, v
j−1
ω ), v
j
ω = β(ω, u
j−1
ω ). Obviously, u
j
ω = u
j−1
ω , v
j
ω = v
j−1
ω , a.e.
on [t, tj+k−2]. From the property of delay, we have α(ω, v
j
ω) = α(ω, v
j−1
ω ) = u
j
ω, β(ω, u
j
ω) =
β(ω, uj−1ω ) = vjω, a.e. on [t, tj+k−1], and ω 7→ (ujω, vjω) is measurable. Consequently, we get the
existence of the measurable mapping Ω ∋ ω 7→ (uω, vω) ∈ Ut,T ×Vt,T satisfying this lemma and the
uniqueness is obvious from the above construction.
Remark 2.1. This lemma implies that, for any partition π of [0, T ]:
For any α ∈ Aπ(t, T ), β ∈ Bπ(t, T ), but also for any α ∈ A(t, T ), β ∈ Bπ(t, T ), and for any
α ∈ Aπ(t, T ), β ∈ B(t, T ), there exists the unique mapping Ω ∋ ω 7→ (uω, vω) ∈ Ut,T × Vt,T , such
that for all ω ∈ Ω,
α(ω, vω) = uω, β(ω, uω) = vω, a.e. on [t, T ].
Remark 2.2. The control processes u and v along the partition π satisfying Lemma 2.1 have the
following form:

u(ω, s) = uk(ω, ζπ1,k−1, s) · I[t,tk)(s) +
N∑
l=k+1
ul(ω, ζπk−1, . . . , ζ
π
l−2, ζ
π
1,l−1, s) · I[tl−1,tl)(s),
v(ω, s) = vk(ω, ζπ2,k−1, s) · I[t,tk)(s) +
N∑
l=k+1
vl(ω, ζπk−1, . . . , ζ
π
l−2, ζ
π
2,l−1, s) · I[tl−1,tl)(s),
where ul, vl are F0,tk−2⊗B(R2(l−k)+1)⊗B([t∨tl−1, tl])-measurable functions, k ≤ l ≤ N . We denoted
by Uπt,T and Vπt,T the set of the processes u and v, respectively, which have the above forms. The
corresponding controls set constructed by Aπ1 (t, T ) and Bπ1 (t, T ) we denoted by Uπ,1t,T and Vπ,1t,T . The
only difference between Uπt,T and Uπ,1t,T is that, if u ∈ Uπ,1t,T , then ul, k ≤ l ≤ N is just B(R2(l−k)+1)⊗
B([t ∨ tl−1, tl])-measurable.
Remark 2.3. We write αˆ ∈ (Aπ(t, T ))I , if αˆ = (α1, . . . , αI) and αi ∈ Aπ(t, T ), i = 1, . . . , I,
and βˆ ∈ (Bπ(t, T ))J , if βˆ = (β1, . . . , βJ ) and βj ∈ Bπ(t, T ), j = 1, . . . , J . Similarly, we have
αˆ ∈ (A(t, T ))I , βˆ ∈ (B(t, T ))J .
Let (p, q) ∈ ∆(I) × ∆(J), (t, x) ∈ [0, T ] × Rn, π = {0 = t0 < t1 < . . . < tN = T} and
t ∈ [tk−1, tk), we define the payoff functionals
J(t, x, αˆ, βˆ, p, q) =
I∑
i=1
J∑
j=1
piqjE[gij(X
t,x,αi,βj
T )].
Now we define the following upper value functions and lower value functions, respectively,
W π(t, x, p, q) = inf
αˆ∈(Aπ(t,T ))I
sup
βˆ∈(Bπ(t,T ))J
J(t, x, αˆ, βˆ, p, q), (2.4)
V π(t, x, p, q) = sup
βˆ∈(Bπ(t,T ))J
inf
αˆ∈(Aπ(t,T ))I
J(t, x, αˆ, βˆ, p, q), (2.5)
W (t, x, p, q) = inf
αˆ∈(A(t,T ))I
sup
βˆ∈(B(t,T ))J
J(t, x, αˆ, βˆ, p, q), (2.6)
V (t, x, p, q) = sup
βˆ∈(B(t,T ))J
inf
αˆ∈(A(t,T ))I
J(t, x, αˆ, βˆ, p, q). (2.7)
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Definition 2.3. Let ε > 0, we say that αˆ ∈ (Aπ(t, T ))I is an ε-optimal randomized strategy for
W π(t, x, p, q), if for all (t, x, p, q) ∈ [0, T ] ×Rn ×∆(I)×∆(J), it holds
|W π(t, x, p, q) − sup
βˆ∈(Bπ(t,T ))J
J(t, x, αˆ, βˆ, p, q)| ≤ ε. (2.8)
We say that βˆ ∈ (Bπ(t, T ))J is an ε-optimal randomized strategy for V π(t, x, p, q), if for all
(t, x, p, q) ∈ [0, T ] × Rn ×∆(I)×∆(J), it holds
|V π(t, x, p, q)− inf
αˆ∈(Aπ(t,T ))I
J(t, x, αˆ, βˆ, p, q)| ≤ ε. (2.9)
Similarly, we define ε-optimal strategies for the other upper and lower value functions.
3 The functions W π(t, x, p, q) and V π(t, x, p, q) without Isaacs condition
In this section we mainly prove that when the mesh of the partition π tends to 0, the functions
W π and V π converge uniformly to the same function which is the unique dual solution of some
Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs (HJI, for short) equation. For this, we introduce the following functions:
W π1 (t, x, p, q) = inf
αˆ∈(Aπ1 (t,T ))I
sup
βˆ∈(Bπ1 (t,T ))J
J(t, x, αˆ, βˆ, p, q), (3.1)
V π1 (t, x, p, q) = sup
βˆ∈(Bπ1 (t,T ))J
inf
αˆ∈(Aπ1 (t,T ))I
J(t, x, αˆ, βˆ, p, q). (3.2)
Theorem 3.1. For any (t, x, p, q) ∈ [0, T ]×Rn×∆(I)×∆(J), it holds V π(t, x, p, q) = V π1 (t, x, p, q),
W π(t, x, p, q) =W π1 (t, x, p, q).
We only give the proof for V π(t, x, p, q) = V π1 (t, x, p, q), the proof forW
π(t, x, p, q) =W π1 (t, x, p, q)
is similar. In order to show that, we need the following auxiliary lower value function:
V˜ π(t, x, p, q) = esssup
βˆ∈(Bπ(t,T ))J
essinf
αˆ∈(Aπ(t,T ))I
I∑
i=1
J∑
j=1
piqjE[gij(X
t,x,αi,βj
T )|F0,tk−2 ]. (3.3)
Lemma 3.1. For all (t, x, p, q) ∈ [0, T ]×Rn×∆(I)×∆(J), the function V˜ π(t, x, p, q) is determin-
istic, i.e., independent of F0,tk−2 , then we have V˜ π(t, x, p, q) = E[V˜ π(t, x, p, q)], P -a.s.
Proof. For Ω = C([0, T ];R2), we assume
H = {h ∈ Ω : ∃ Radon-Nikodym derivative h˙ ∈ L2([0, T ];R2), h(s) = h(s ∧ tk−2), s ∈ [0, T ]}, then
we know H is the Cameron-Martin space. For any h ∈ H, we define the mapping τh : Ω 7→ Ω by
τh(ω) := ω + h, ω ∈ Ω. Then, we know τh is a bijection and τ−1h = τ−h.
For any α ∈ Aπ(t, T ), we know α has the form of
α(ω, v)(s) = αk(ω, ζ
π
1,k−1(ω), v)(s)I[t,tk)(s) +
N∑
l=k+1
αl(ω, (ζ
π
k−1, . . . , ζ
π
l−2, ζ
π
1,l−1)(ω), v)(s)I[tl−1 ,tl)(s).
Then, for any h ∈ H, we define
αh(ω, v)(s)
:= αk(τh(ω), ζ
π
1,k−1(ω), v)(s)I[t,tk)(s) +
N∑
l=k+1
αl(τh(ω), (ζ
π
k−1, . . . , ζ
π
l−2, ζ
π
1,l−1)(ω), v)(s)I[tl−1 ,tl)(s).
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Obviously, we know αh ∈ Aπ(t, T ), and the mapping α 7→ αh is a bijection on Aπ(t, T ). For any
h ∈ H, β ∈ Bπ(t, T ), βh is similarly defined and β 7→ βh is a bijection on Bπ(t, T ). Then we get
E[gij(X
t,x,αi,βj
T )|F0,tk−2 ] ◦ τh = E[gij(X
t,x,αhi ,β
h
j
T )|F0,tk−2 ], P -a.s. (3.4)
We now define I(t, x, p, q, βˆ) := essinf
αˆ∈(Aπ(t,T ))I
I∑
i=1
J∑
j=1
piqjE[gij(X
t,x,αi,βj
T )|F0,tk−2 ], βˆ ∈ (Bπ(t, T ))J .
Since I(t, x, p, q, βˆ) ≤
I∑
i=1
J∑
j=1
piqjE[gij(X
t,x,αi,βj
T )|F0,tk−2 ], P -a.s., from (3.4) we get
I(t, x, p, q, βˆ) ◦ τh ≤
I∑
i=1
J∑
j=1
piqjE[gij(X
t,x,αhi ,β
h
j
T )|F0,tk−2 ], P -a.s. (3.5)
On the other hand, for any random variable ξ, such that ξ ≤
I∑
i=1
J∑
j=1
piqjE[gij(X
t,x,αhi ,β
h
j
T )|F0,tk−2 ],
P -a.s., we have that ξ ◦ τ−h ≤
I∑
i=1
J∑
j=1
piqjE[gij(X
t,x,αi,βj
T )|F0,tk−2 ], P -a.s., for all αˆ ∈ Aπ(t, T ), then
we know ξ ◦ τ−h ≤ I(t, x, p, q, βˆ), P -a.s., which means that ξ ≤ I(t, x, p, q, βˆ) ◦ τh. Thus we have
I(t, x, p, q, βˆ) ◦ τh = essinf
αˆ∈(Aπ(t,T ))I
I∑
i=1
J∑
j=1
piqjE[gij(X
t,x,αhi ,β
h
j
T )|F0,tk−2 ], P -a.s. (3.6)
Using the similar method, we obtain(
esssup
βˆ∈(Bπ(t,T ))J
I(t, x, p, q, βˆ)
)
◦ τh = esssup
βˆ∈(Bπ(t,T ))J
(
I(t, x, p, q, βˆ) ◦ τh
)
, P -a.s. (3.7)
Therefore, for all h ∈ H, from (3.7) and (3.6) we get, P -a.s.,
V˜ π(t, x, p, q) ◦ τh =
(
esssup
βˆ∈(Bπ(t,T ))J
I(t, x, p, q, βˆ)
)
◦ τh
= esssup
βˆ∈(Bπ(t,T ))J
essinf
αˆ∈(Aπ(t,T ))I
I∑
i=1
J∑
j=1
piqjE[gij(X
t,x,αhi ,β
h
j
T )|F0,tk−2 ]
= esssup
βˆ∈(Bπ(t,T ))J
essinf
αˆ∈(Aπ(t,T ))I
I∑
i=1
J∑
j=1
piqjE[gij(X
t,x,αi,βj
T )|F0,tk−2 ] = V˜ π(t, x, p, q).
(3.8)
Then combined with Lemma 4.1 in [2], we obtain our desired results.
Now we give the proof of Theorem 3.1.
Proof. Step 1: We prove V˜ π(t, x, p, q) = V π1 (t, x, p, q), for all (t, x, p, q) ∈ [0, T ]×Rn×∆(I)×∆(J).
For any βˆ ∈ (Bπ1 (t, T ))J (independent of Ftk−2), we have
V˜ π(t, x, p, q) ≥ essinf
αˆ∈(Aπ(t,T ))I
I∑
i=1
J∑
j=1
piqjE[gij(X
t,x,αi,βj
T )|F0,tk−2 ], P -a.s.
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For any ε > 0, there exists αˆ ∈ (Aπ(t, T ))I (depending on ε, βˆ), such that
V˜ π(t, x, p, q) ≥
I∑
i=1
J∑
j=1
piqjE[gij(X
t,x,αi,βj
T )|F0,tk−2 ]− ε, P -a.s. (3.9)
From Lemma 3.1 and (3.9), we have
V˜ π(t, x, p, q) = E[V˜ π(t, x, p, q)] ≥
I∑
i=1
J∑
j=1
piqjE[gij(X
t,x,αi,βj
T )]− ε
≥ inf
αˆ∈(Aπ1 (t,T ))I
I∑
i=1
J∑
j=1
piqjE[gij(X
t,x,αi,βj
T )]− ε.
(3.10)
Since (3.10) holds for any βˆ ∈ (Bπ1 (t, T ))J , we get
V˜ π(t, x, p, q) ≥ sup
βˆ∈(Bπ1 (t,T ))J
inf
αˆ∈(Aπ1 (t,T ))I
I∑
i=1
J∑
j=1
piqjE[gij(X
t,x,αi,βj
T )]− ε = V π1 (t, x, p, q) − ε. (3.11)
From the arbitrariness of ε, we obtain V˜ π(t, x, p, q) ≥ V π1 (t, x, p, q).
On the other hand, for any ε > 0, there exists βˆ ∈ (Bπ(t, T ))J , such that, P -a.s.,
V˜ π(t, x, p, q) ≤ essinf
αˆ∈(Aπ(t,T ))I
I∑
i=1
J∑
j=1
piqjE[gij(X
t,x,αi,βj
T )|F0,tk−2 ] + ε
≤ essinf
αˆ∈(Aπ1 (t,T ))I
I∑
i=1
J∑
j=1
piqjE[gij(X
t,x,αi,βj
T )|F0,tk−2 ] + ε.
(3.12)
Notice that E[gij(X
t,x,αi,βj
T )|F0,tk−2 ](ω) = E[gij(X
t,x,αi,β
ω¯
j
T )], P (dω)-a.s., where ω¯(s) = ω(s ∧ tk2),
s ∈ [0, T ]. Thus, from (3.12) we have
V˜ π(t, x, p, q) ≤ essinf
αˆ∈(Aπ1 (t,T ))I
I∑
i=1
J∑
j=1
piqjE[gij(X
t,x,αi,β
ω¯
j
T )] + ε
≤ esssup
βˆ∈(Bπ1 (t,T ))J
essinf
αˆ∈(Aπ1 (t,T ))I
I∑
i=1
J∑
j=1
piqjE[gij(X
t,x,αi,β
ω¯
j
T )] + ε = V
π
1 (t, x, p, q) + ε.
(3.13)
From the arbitrariness of ε, we obtain V˜ π(t, x, p, q) ≤ V π1 (t, x, p, q).
Step 2: We prove V˜ π(t, x, p, q) = V π(t, x, p, q), for all (t, x, p, q) ∈ [0, T ]× Rn ×∆(I)×∆(J).
For any ε > 0, there exists αˆ ∈ (Aπ(t, T ))I , such that, P -a.s.,
V˜ π(t, x, p, q) ≥ essinf
αˆ∈(Aπ(t,T ))I
I∑
i=1
J∑
j=1
piqjE[gij(X
t,x,αi,βj
T )|F0,tk−2 ]
≥
I∑
i=1
J∑
j=1
piqjE[gij(X
t,x,αi,βj
T )|F0,tk−2 ]− ε.
(3.14)
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From Lemma 3.1 and (3.14), we have
V˜ π(t, x, p, q) = E[V˜ π(t, x, p, q)] ≥
I∑
i=1
J∑
j=1
piqjE[gij(X
t,x,αi,βj
T )]− ε
≥ inf
αˆ∈(Aπ(t,T ))I
I∑
i=1
J∑
j=1
piqjE[gij(X
t,x,αi,βj
T )]− ε.
(3.15)
Thanks to (3.15) holds for any βˆ ∈ (Bπ(t, T ))J and from the arbitrariness of ε, we have V˜ π(t, x, p, q) ≥
V π(t, x, p, q). On the other hand, for any ε > 0, there exists βˆ ∈ (Bπ(t, T ))J , such that, P -a.s.,
V˜ π(t, x, p, q) ≤ essinf
αˆ∈(Aπ(t,T ))I
I∑
i=1
J∑
j=1
piqjE[gij(X
t,x,αi,βj
T )|F0,tk−2 ] + ε
≤
I∑
i=1
J∑
j=1
piqjE[gij(X
t,x,αi,βj
T )|F0,tk−2 ] + ε.
(3.16)
From Lemma 3.1, thanks to (3.16) holds for every αˆ ∈ (Aπ(t, T ))I , we have
V˜ π(t, x, p, q) = E[V˜ π(t, x, p, q)] ≤
I∑
i=1
J∑
j=1
piqjE[gij(X
t,x,αi,βj
T )] + ε
≤ inf
αˆ∈(Aπ(t,T ))I
I∑
i=1
J∑
j=1
piqjE[gij(X
t,x,αi,βj
T )] + ε
≤ sup
βˆ∈(Bπ(t,T ))J
inf
αˆ∈(Aπ(t,T ))I
I∑
i=1
J∑
j=1
piqjE[gij(X
t,x,αi,βj
T )] + ε = V
π(t, x, p, q) + ε.
(3.17)
Thus, we obtain V˜ π(t, x, p, q) ≤ V π(t, x, p, q). Finally, from Step 1 and Step 2, we have V π(t, x, p, q) =
V˜ π(t, x, p, q) = V π1 (t, x, p, q).
We now prove that when the mesh of the partition π tends to 0, the functions W π1 and V
π
1
converge uniformly to the same function which is the unique dual solution of some HJI equation.
Lemma 3.2. The functions W π1 and V
π
1 are Lipschitz continuous with respect to (t, x, p, q), uni-
formly with respect to π.
Proof. We just give the proof for V π1 , the proof of W
π
1 is similar.
Since the cost functionals gij are bounded, from the definition of V
π
1 , we obviously have that V
π
1
is Lipschitz with respect to p and q. For any t ∈ [0, T ], (u, v) ∈ Ut,T×Vt,T , from (2.2), the functional
gij(X
t,x,u,v
T ) is Lipschitz continuous with respect to x, then for any (αˆ, βˆ) ∈ (Aπ1 (t, T ))I×(Bπ1 (t, T ))J ,
we have that J(t, x, αˆ, βˆ, p, q) is Lipschitz continuous with respect to x. Moreover, the Lipschitz
constant only depends on the Lipschitz constants of gij and the bound of f . Thus we have V
π
1 is
Lipschitz with respect to x.
Now we only need to show V π1 is Lipschitz with respect to t. Let x ∈ Rn, (p, q) ∈ ∆(I)×∆(J),
and t < t′ < T be arbitrarily fixed. Let βˆ = (βj)j=1,2,...,J ∈ (Bπ1 (t, T ))J be an ε-optimal strategy
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for V π1 (t, x, p, q). We define a strategy β
′
j ∈ Bπ1 (t′, T ) associated with βj . For this end, we put for
all u ∈ Ut′,T ,
β˜j(ω, u) = βj(ω, u˜), where u˜(s) =
{
u¯, s ∈ [t, t′),
u(s), s ∈ [t′, T ],
and u¯ ∈ U is an arbitrarily given constant control.
If t′ < tk, then β˜j ∈ Bπ1 (t′, T ) and we define β′j = β˜j . Otherwise, we let l ≥ k + 1 be such that
tl−1 ≤ t′ < tl. We now consider 2(l − k) + 1 random variables ηik−1, . . . , ηil−2, η1l−1, i = 1, 2,
defined on ([0, 1],B([0, 1]), dx) with η1l−1(x) = x, x ∈ [0, 1], which are mutually independent,
independent of ζπi,j, (i, j) 6= (2, l − 1), and uniformly distributed on [0, 1]. Then the composed
random variables η1k−1 ◦ζπ2,l−1, η2k−1 ◦ζπ2,l−1, . . . , η1l−1 ◦ζπ2,l−1, are mutually independent, independent
of all ζπi,j, (i, j) 6= (2, l − 1), uniformly distributed random variables.
For any u ∈ Ut′,T , s ∈ [t′, T ], we define
β′j(ω, u)(s)
=
N∑
m=l
β˜j,m
(
(η1k−1 ◦ ζπ2,l−1, η2k−1 ◦ ζπ2,l−1, . . . , η1l−1 ◦ ζπ2,l−1, ζπ1,l−1, ζπl , . . . , ζπm−2, ζπ2,m−1)(ω), u
)
(s) ·
I[t′∨tm−1,tm)(s).
where β˜j,m(ω, u)(s) = β˜j(ω, u)(s)I[t∨tm−1 ,tm)(s). Then we have β
′
j ∈ Bπ1 (t′, T ). Notice that for all u ∈
Ut′,T , β′j(u) and β˜j(u) obey the same law knowing ζπl−1, . . . , ζπN−1. Therefore, E[gij(X
t′,x,u,β′j(u)
T )] =
E[gij(X
t′,x,u,β˜j(u)
T )]. Then for all αˆ ∈ (Aπ1 (t′, T ))I ,
J(t′, x, αˆ, (β′j), p, q) = J(t
′, x, αˆ, (β˜j), p, q). (3.18)
Now for any α ∈ Aπ1 (t′, T ), we define a strategy α′ ∈ Aπ1 (t, T ) associated with α as follows, for all
v ∈ Vt,T ,
α′(ω, v)(s) =
{
u¯(s), s ∈ [t, t′),
α(ω, v|[t′,T ])(s), s ∈ [t′, T ].
Through the above construction and from Lemma 2.1, the couples of admissible controls related
to the couples of strategies (α′, βj) and (α, β˜j) coincide on the interval [t′, T ]. Hence, using the
standard estimate and Gronwall inequality we have
E[|Xt,x,α′,βjs −Xt
′,x,α,β˜j
s |] ≤M |t′ − t|, s ∈ [t′, T ], (3.19)
where the constant M only depends on the bound of f as well as the Lipschitz constant of f . Thus,
for any αˆ ∈ (Aπ1 (t′, T ))I , from (3.18), (3.19) and (2.9), we have
J(t′, x, αˆ, (β′j), p, q) = J(t
′, x, αˆ, (β˜j), p, q) ≥ J(t, x, αˆ′, βˆ, p, q)− C|t′ − t|
≥ inf
αˆ
′′∈(Aπ1 (t,T ))I
J(t, x, αˆ
′′
, βˆ, p, q)−C|t′ − t| ≥ V π1 (t, x, p, q)− ε− C|t′ − t|,
Therefore,
V π1 (t
′, x, p, q) ≥ V π1 (t, x, p, q)− ε−C|t′ − t|. (3.20)
Similarly, if we assume that βˆ ∈ (Bπ1 (t′, T ))J is ε-optimal for V π1 (t′, x, p, q), then we can get
V π1 (t, x, p, q) ≥ V π1 (t′, x, p, q)− ε−C|t′ − t|. (3.21)
Moreover, from the arbitrariness of ε > 0, we obtain V π1 is Lipschitz continuous in t.
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Lemma 3.3. For any (t, x) ∈ [0, T ] × Rn, the functions W π1 (t, x, p, q) and V π1 (t, x, p, q) both are
convex in p and concave in q on ∆(I) and ∆(J).
Proof. We just give the proof for V π1 , the proof of W
π
1 is similar.
It is obvious that
V π1 (t, x, p, q) = sup
(βj)∈(Bπ1 (t,T ))J
I∑
i=1
pi inf
α∈Aπ1 (t,T )
J∑
j=1
qjE[gij(X
t,x,α,βj
T )]. (3.22)
then we know V π1 (t, x, p, q) is convex in p.
Now we prove that V π1 (t, x, p, q) is concave in q. Let (t, x, p) ∈ [0, T ] × Rn × ∆(I), q0, q1 ∈
∆(J), λ ∈ (0, 1), and let βˆ0 = (β0j )j=1,...,J ∈ (Bπ1 (t, T ))J and βˆ1 = (β1j )j=1,...,J ∈ (Bπ1 (t, T ))J
be ε-optimal for V π1 (t, x, p, q
0) and V π1 (t, x, p, q
1), respectively. For q0 = (q01 , . . . , q
0
J) and q
1 =
(q11 , . . . , q
1
J), we define q
λ
j = (1 − λ)q0j + λq1j and qλ = (qλ1 , . . . , qλJ) ∈ ∆(J). Without loss of
generality, we assume qλj > 0, j = 1, . . . , J , then we define cj =
(1−λ)q0j
qλj
, j = 1, . . . , J . For ω ∈ Ω,
u ∈ Ut,T , s ∈ [t, T ), we define the strategy βˆλ = (βλj )j=1,...,J and βλj (y1, . . . , y2(N−k)+1, u)(s) =
β0j (y1, y2, . . . , y2(N−k),
1
cj
y2(N−k)+1, u)(s) + β1j (y1, y2, . . . , y2(N−k),
1
1−cj (y2(N−k)+1 − cj), u)(s),
where βij((ζ
π
k−1, . . . , ζ
π
N−2, ζ
π
2,N−1)(ω), u)(s) =
N∑
l=k
βilj((ζ
π
k−1, . . . , ζ
π
l−2, ζ
π
2,l−1)(ω), u)I[t∨tl−1 ,tl](s), i =
0, 1, respectively. Then we have (βλj ) ∈ (Bπ1 (t, T ))J . Therefore, we have
inf
α∈(Aπ1 (t,T ))I
J(t, x, αˆ, βˆλ, p, qλ) =
I∑
i=1
pi inf
α∈Aπ1 (t,T )
J∑
j=1
qλjE[gij(X
t,x,α,βλj
T )]
=
I∑
i=1
pi inf
α∈Aπ1 (t,T )
J∑
j=1
qλj
( ∫
[0,cj ]
E[gij(X
t,x,α,β0j ((ζ
π
2,k−1,ζ
π
1,k−1,ζ
π
k ,...,ζ
π
N−2,
1
cj
y2(N−k)+1)(ω),·)
T )]dy2(N−k)+1
+
∫
[cj,1]
E[gij(X
t,x,α,β1j ((ζ
π
2,k−1,ζ
π
1,k−1,ζ
π
k ,...,ζ
π
N−2,
1
1−cj
(y2(N−k)+1−cj))(ω),·)
T )]dy2(N−k)+1
)
=
I∑
i=1
pi inf
α∈Aπ1 (t,T )
J∑
j=1
qλj
[(1− λ)q0j
qλj
E[gij(X
t,x,α,β0j
T )] +
λq1j
qλj
E[gij(X
t,x,α,β1j
T )]
]
≥ (1− λ)
I∑
i=1
pi inf
α∈Aπ1 (t,T )
J∑
j=1
q0jE[gij(X
t,x,α,β0j
T )] + λ
I∑
i=1
pi inf
α∈Aπ1 (t,T )
J∑
j=1
q1jE[gij(X
t,x,α,β1j
T )]
≥ (1− λ)V π1 (t, x, p, q0) + λV π1 (t, x, p, q1)− 2ε,
since βˆ0 and βˆ1 are ε-optimal strategies for V π1 (t, x, p, q
0) and V π1 (t, x, p, q
1), respectively. Thus,
V π1 (t, x, p, q
λ) ≥ inf
α∈(Aπ1 (t,T ))I
J(t, x, αˆ, βˆλ, p, qλ) ≥ (1−λ)V π1 (t, x, p, q0)+λV π1 (t, x, p, q1)− ε. (3.23)
Thanks to the arbitrariness of ε, we obtain the desired result.
Now we introduce the Fenchel transforms (refer to [5]). Assume a mapping ψ : [0, T ] × Rn ×
∆(I)×∆(J)→ R convex in p and concave in q on ∆(I) and ∆(J), respectively, then we define its
convex conjugate (with respect to variable p) ψ∗ by
ψ∗(t, x, p¯, q) = sup
p∈∆(I)
{p¯ · p− ψ(t, x, p, q)}, (t, x, p¯, q) ∈ [0, T ] × Rn × RI ×∆(J), (3.24)
12
and its concave conjugate (with respect to variable q) ψ# by
ψ#(t, x, p, q¯) = inf
q∈∆(J)
{q¯ · q − ψ(t, x, p, q)}, (t, x, p, q¯) ∈ [0, T ] × Rn ×∆(I)× RJ . (3.25)
Using these notations we denote by V π∗1 (W
π#
1 ) for the convex (respectively, concave) conjugate of
V π1 (respectively, W
π
1 ) with respect to p (respectively, q).
Lemma 3.4. For all (t, x, p¯, q) ∈ [0, T ]× Rn × RI ×∆(J), we have
V π∗1 (t, x, p¯, q) = inf
(βj)∈(Bπ1 (t,T ))J
sup
α∈Aπ1 (t,T )
max
i∈{1,...,I}
{p¯i −
J∑
j=1
qjE[gij(X
t,x,α,βj
T )]}. (3.26)
Proof. We define
F (t, x, p¯, q) = inf
(βj)∈(Bπ1 (t,T ))J
sup
α∈Aπ1 (t,T )
max
i∈{1,...,I}
{p¯i −
J∑
j=1
qjE[gij(X
t,x,α,βj
T )]}. (3.27)
It is obviously that F (t, x, p¯, q) is convex with respect to p¯. From (3.24) and (3.27), we have
F ∗(t, x, p, q) = sup
p¯∈RI
{p · p¯− inf
(βj)
max
i∈{1,...,I}
{p¯i − inf
α
J∑
j=1
qjE[gij(X
t,x,α,βj
T )]}}
= sup
(βj)
sup
p¯∈RI
min
i∈{1,...,I}
{p · p¯− p¯i + inf
α
J∑
j=1
qjE[gij(X
t,x,α,βj
T )]}
= sup
(βj)
sup
p¯∈RI
min
i∈{1,...,I}
{p · p¯− p¯i + hi},
(3.28)
where we define hi := inf
α
J∑
j=1
qjE[gij(X
t,x,α,βj
T )], 1 ≤ i ≤ I.
On the other hand,
sup
p¯∈RI
min
i∈{1,...,I}
{p · p¯− p¯i + hi} = sup
p¯∈RI
{p · p¯+ min
i∈{1,...,I}
{hi − p¯i}} = sup
p¯∈RI
{p · p¯+ inf
p¯∈∆(I)
(h− p¯)p¯}
= sup
p¯∈RI
inf
p¯∈∆(I)
{(h − p¯)p¯ + p · p¯} = inf
p¯∈∆(I)
sup
p¯∈RI
{(p − p¯)p¯+ h · p¯}
= h · p.
(3.29)
From (3.28), (3.29) and (3.22), we get
F ∗(t, x, p, q) = sup
(βj)
I∑
i=1
pi inf
α
J∑
j=1
qjE[gij(X
t,x,α,βj
T )] = V
π
1 (t, x, p, q). (3.30)
Since F is convex in p¯, we have V π∗1 = F
∗∗ = F .
Using the definition of V π∗1 and W
π#
1 , from Lemma 3.2 we have the following lemma.
Lemma 3.5. For all the partition π of the interval [0, T ], the convex conjugate function V π∗1 (t, x, p¯, q)
is Lipschitz with respect to (t, x, p¯, q), the concave conjugate functionW π#1 (t, x, p, q¯) is Lipschitz with
respect to (t, x, p, q¯).
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Generally speaking, the game with asymmetric information does not have the dynamic pro-
gramming principle, but it has s sub-dynamic programming principle.
Lemma 3.6. For any (t, x, p¯, q) ∈ [tk−1, tk)×Rn ×RI ×∆(J), and for all l (k ≤ l ≤ N), we have
V π∗1 (t, x, p¯, q) ≤ inf
β∈Bπ1 (t,tl)
sup
α∈Aπ1 (t,tl)
E[V π∗1 (tl,X
t,x,α,β
tl
, p¯, q)]. (3.31)
Proof. We define
G(t, tl, x, p¯, q) = inf
β∈Bπ1 (t,tl)
sup
α∈Aπ1 (t,tl)
E[V π∗1 (tl,X
t,x,α,β
tl
, p¯, q)]. (3.32)
For any given ε > 0, let β0 ∈ Bπ1 (t, tl) be an ε-optimal strategy for G(t, tl, x, p¯, q), i.e.,
|G(t, tl, x, p¯, q)− sup
α∈Aπ1 (t,tl)
E[V π∗1 (tl,X
t,x,α,β0
tl
, p¯, q)]| ≤ ε. (3.33)
For any y ∈ Rn, there exists an ε-optimal strategy βˆy = (βyj )j=1,...,J ∈ (Bπ1 (tl, T ))J for V π∗1 (tl, y, p¯, q)
for Player II, i.e.,
|V π∗1 (tl, y, p¯, q)− sup
α∈Aπ1 (tl ,T )
max
i∈{1,...,I}
{p¯i −
J∑
j=1
qjE[gij(X
tl,y,α,β
y
j
T )]}| ≤ ε. (3.34)
Because supα∈Aπ1 (tl,T )maxi∈{1,...,I}
{
p¯i−
∑J
j=1 qjE[gij(X
tl,y,α,β
y
j
T )]
}
and V π∗1 (tl, y, p¯, q) are Lipschitz
continuous with respect to y, βˆy is a (2ε)-optimal strategies for V π∗1 (tl, z, p¯, q), if z ∈ Br(y), where
Br(y) is the ball with small enough radius r.
Since the coefficient f is bounded, there exists some R > 0 large enough such that all the value
of Xt,x,α,βtl belong to the ball BR(0). Then we assume (On), n = 1, . . . , n0, is a finite Borel partition
of BR(0). For any xn ∈ On, we denote βnj = βxnj , n = 1, . . . , n0, the strategy (βnj ) is (2ε)-optimal
for V π∗1 (tl, z, p¯, q), for any z ∈ On, i.e.,
|V π∗1 (tl, z, p¯, q)− sup
α∈Aπ1 (tl,T )
max
i∈{1,...,I}
{p¯i −
J∑
j=1
qjE[gij(X
tl,z,α,β
n
j
T )]}| ≤ 2ε. (3.35)
For any ω ∈ Ω and u ∈ Ut,T , we define
βj(ω, u)(s) =


β0(ω, u)(s), s ∈ [t, tl),
n0∑
n=1
βnj (ω, u|[tl,T )) · I{Xt,x,u,β0(u)tl ∈On}
, s ∈ [tl, T ].
Then, we have βj ∈ Bπ1 (t, T ). For any α ∈ Aπ1 (t, T ), we know α has the following form:
α(ω, v)(s) =
l∑
m=k
αm((ζ
π
1,k−1, ζ
π
2,k−1, . . . , ζ
π
1,m−1)(ω), v)(s)I[t∨tm−1 ,tm)(s)
+
N∑
m=l+1
αm((ζ
π
1,k−1, ζ
π
2,k−1, . . . , ζ
π
1,l−1, ζ
π
2,l−1, ζ
π
1,l, ζ
π
2,l, ζ
π
l+1, . . . , ζ
π
m−2, ζ
π
1,m−1)(ω), v)(s)I[tm−1 ,tm)(s).
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For s ∈ [tl, T ], we define α˜(ω,Q, v)(s) =
∑N
m=l+1 αm(Q, (ζ
π
1,l, ζ
π
2,l, . . . , ζ
π
1,m−1)(ω), v)(s)I[tm−1 ,tm)(s),
where Q is a 2(l− k)+2-dimensional constant vector. Obviously, we know α˜(Q) ∈ Aπ1 (tl, T ). Then
for any α ∈ Aπ1 (t, T ), due to Xt,x,α,β
0
tl
and Q0 = (ζ
π
1,k−1, ζ
π
2,k−1, . . . , ζ
π
1,l−1, ζ
π
2,l−1) are Ftk−2,tl−1-
measurable, βnj and α˜ are Ftl−1,T -measurable, we have
E[gij(X
t,x,α,βj
T )] = E[
n0∑
n=1
gij(X
tl ,X
t,x,α,β0
tl
,α˜(Q0),βnj
T ) · I{Xt,x,α,β0tl ∈On}
]
= E[
n0∑
n=1
E[gij(X
tl,y,α˜(Q),β
n
j
T )]y=Xt,x,α,β
0
tl
,Q=Q0
· I{Xt,x,α,β0tl ∈On}
].
(3.36)
From (3.36), (3.35) and (3.33), we have
max
i∈{1,...,I}
{
p¯i −
J∑
j=1
qjE[gij(X
t,x,α,βj
T )]
}
= max
i∈{1,...,I}
{
p¯i −
J∑
j=1
qjE
[ n0∑
n=1
E[gij(X
tl,y,α˜(Q),β
n
j
T )]y=Xt,x,α,β
0
tl
,Q=Q0
· I{Xt,x,α,β0tl ∈On}
]}
≤E[ n0∑
n=1
max
i∈{1,...,I}
{p¯i −
J∑
j=1
qjE[gij(X
tl ,y,α˜(Q),β
n
j
T )]}y=Xt,x,α,β0tl ,Q=Q0
· I{Xt,x,α,β0tl ∈On}
]
≤E[ n0∑
n=1
sup
α′∈Aπ1 (tl,T )
max
i∈{1,...,I}
{p¯i −
J∑
j=1
qjE[gij(X
tl,y,α
′,βnj
T )]}y=Xt,x,α,β0tl
· I{Xt,x,α,β0tl ∈On}
]
≤E[
n0∑
n=1
V π∗1 (tl,X
t,x,α,β0
tl
, p¯, q) · I{Xt,x,α,β0tl ∈On}
] + 2ε
≤G(t, tl, x, p¯, q) + 3ε,
(3.37)
which means that V π∗1 (t, x, p¯, q) ≤ G(t, tl, x, p¯, q).
We assume (πn)n≥1 is a sequence partitions of the interval [0, T ] satisfying that when n →∞,
the mesh of the partition |πn| tends to zero. From Lemma 3.5, applying the Arzela`-Ascoli Theorem
to V πn∗1 (t, x, p¯, q) and W
πn#
1 (t, x, p, q¯), we have the following lemma.
Lemma 3.7. There exists a subsequence of partitions (πn)n≥1, still denoted by (πn)n≥1 and two
functions V˜ : [0, T ] × Rn × RI × ∆(J) 7→ R and W˜ : [0, T ] × Rn × ∆(I) × RJ 7→ R such that
(V πn∗1 ,W
πn#
1 )→ (V˜ , W˜ ) uniformly on compacts in [0, T ] × Rn ×∆(I)×∆(J)× RI × RJ .
Remark 3.1. Notice that from Lemma 3.5, the limit functions V˜ and W˜ are Lipschitz continuous
with respect to all their variables.
Now we prove that the limit functions V˜ and W˜ are a viscosity subsolution and a viscosity
supersolution of some HJI equation, respectively. For more details on viscosity solutions, the
reader is referred to [7].
Lemma 3.8. The limit function V˜ (t, x, p¯, q) is a viscosity subsolution of the following HJI equation

∂V˜
∂t
(t, x) +H∗(x,DV˜ (t, x)) = 0, (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× Rn,
V˜ (T, x) = max
i∈{1,...,I}
{p¯i −
J∑
j=1
qjgij(x)}, (p¯, q) ∈ RI ×∆(J), (3.38)
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where
H∗(x, ξ) = −H(x,−ξ) = inf
ν∈P(V )
sup
µ∈P(U)
( ∫
U×V
f(x, u, v)µ(du)ν(dv) · ξ)
= sup
µ∈P(U)
inf
ν∈P(V )
( ∫
U×V
f(x, u, v)µ(du)ν(dv) · ξ).
Proof. For simplicity, we denote V˜ (t, x, p¯, q) by V˜ (t, x), for fixed (p¯, q) ∈ RI × ∆(J). For any
fixed (t, x) ∈ [0, T ] × Rn, since the coefficient f is bounded, there is some M > 0 such that,
B¯M (x) ⊃ {Xs,y,α,βr , (s, y) ∈ [0, T ] × B¯1(x), (α, β) ∈ Aπ1 (s, T ) × Bπ1 (s, T ), r ∈ [s, T ]}, where B¯M (x)
is the closed ball with the center x and the radius M . From Lemma 3.7, we know V πn∗1 converge
to V˜ over [0, T ]× B¯M (x). Let ϕ ∈ C1b ([0, T ]×Rn) (the set of bounded continuous functions where
the first order partial derivate is bounded and continuous) be a test function such that
(V˜ − ϕ)(t, x) > (V˜ − ϕ)(s, y), for all (s, y) ∈ [0, T ] × B¯M (x) \ {(t, x)}. (3.39)
Let (sn, xn) ∈ [0, T ] × B¯M (x) be the maximum point of V πn∗1 − ϕ over [0, T ] × B¯M (x), then there
exists a subsequence of (sn, xn) still denoted by (sn, xn), such that (sn, xn) converges to (t, x).
Indeed, since [0, T ] × B¯M (x) is a compact set, there exists a subsequence (sn, xn) and (s¯, x¯) ∈
[0, T ]× B¯M (x) such that (sn, xn)→ (s¯, x¯). Due to (V πn∗1 −ϕ)(sn, xn) ≥ (V πn∗1 −ϕ)(t, x), for n ≥ 1,
we have
(V˜ − ϕ)(s¯, x¯) ≥ (V˜ − ϕ)(t, x). (3.40)
From (3.39) and (3.40), we have (s¯, x¯) = (t, x).
For the partition πn, we assume t
n
kn−1
≤ sn < tnkn , for simplicity, we write tnk−1 ≤ sn < tnk . Since
xn → x, there is a positive integer N such that for all n ≥ N , we have |xn − x| ≤ 1. Then from
Lemma 3.6, we get
ϕ(sn, xn) = V
πn∗
1 (sn, xn) ≤ inf
β∈Bπn1 (sn,tnk )
sup
α∈Aπn1 (sn,tnk )
E[V πn∗1 (t
n
k ,X
sn,xn,α,β
tn
k
)]
≤ inf
β∈Bπn1 (sn,tnk )
sup
α∈Aπn1 (sn,tnk )
E[ϕ(tnk ,X
sn,xn,α,β
tn
k
)].
(3.41)
Thus we get
0 ≤ inf
β∈Bπn1 (sn,tnk )
sup
α∈Aπn1 (sn,tnk )
E[ϕ(tnk ,X
sn,xn,α,β
tn
k
)− ϕ(sn, xn)]
= inf
β∈Bπn1 (sn,tnk )
sup
α∈Aπn1 (sn,tnk )
E[
∫ tnk
sn
(
∂ϕ
∂r
(r,Xsn,xn,α,βr ) + f(X
sn,xn,α,β
r , αr, βr) ·Dϕ(r,Xsn,xn,α,βr ))dr].
(3.42)
For (u, v) ∈ Ut,T × Vt,T , we introduce the following continuity modulus,
m(δ) := sup
|r − s| + |y − x¯| ≤ δ,
u ∈ U, v ∈ V, x¯, y ∈ B¯M (x)
∣∣(∂ϕ
∂r
(r, y) + f(y, u, v) ·Dϕ(r, y))− (∂ϕ
∂r
(s, x¯) + f(x¯, u, v) ·Dϕ(s, x¯))∣∣.
(3.43)
Obviously, m(δ) is nondecreasing in δ and m(δ) → 0, as δ ↓ 0. From (2.2), considering that
|Xsn,xn,α,βr − xn| ≤ C|r − sn| ≤ C|tnk − sn|, r ∈ [sn, tnk ] and from (3.43) we know that
|(∂ϕ
∂r
(r,Xsn,xn,α,βr ) + f(X
sn,xn,α,β
r , αr, βr) ·Dϕ(r,Xsn,xn,α,βr ))−
(∂ϕ
∂r
(sn, xn) + f(xn, αr, βr) ·Dϕ(sn, xn))| ≤ m(C|tnk − sn|), r ∈ [sn, tnk ].
(3.44)
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It follows from (3.42) and (3.44) that
− (tnk − sn)
(∂ϕ
∂r
(sn, xn) +m(C|tnk − sn|)
)
≤ inf
β∈Bπn1 (sn,tnk )
sup
α∈Aπn1 (sn,tnk )
E[
∫ tnk
sn
f(xn, αr, βr) ·Dϕ(sn, xn)dr]
≤ sup
α∈Aπn1 (sn,tnk )
E[
∫ tnk
sn
f(xn, αr, β˜r) ·Dϕ(sn, xn)dr],
(3.45)
where we take β˜r = v˜(ζ
πn
2,k−1), r ∈ [sn, tnk ], v˜ is a V -valued measurable function. Define ρn =
(tnk − sn)2, from (3.45) there exists a ρn-optimal strategy αn (depending on β˜) such that
− (tnk − sn)
(∂ϕ
∂r
(sn, xn) +m(C|tnk − sn|) + (tnk − sn)
) ≤ E[∫ tnk
sn
f(xn, α
n
r , β˜r) ·Dϕ(sn, xn)dr]
=
∫ tnk
sn
E[f(xn, α
n
r (ζ
πn
1,k−1, v˜), v˜(ζ
πn
2,k−1)) ·Dϕ(sn, xn)]dr.
(3.46)
Notice that on the interval [sn, t
n
k ], α
n does not depend on the control v˜ due to the delay property.
Then thanks to the independence between ζπn1,k−1 and ζ
πn
2,k−1, from (3.46) we get
− (tnk − sn)
(∂ϕ
∂r
(sn, xn) +m(C|tnk − sn|) + (tnk − sn)
)
≤
∫ tnk
sn
sup
µ∈P(U)
∫
U
E[f(xn, u, v˜(ζ
πn
2,k−1)) ·Dϕ(sn, xn)]µ(du)dr.
(3.47)
From the arbitrariness of v˜, from (3.47) we get
− (tnk − sn)
(∂ϕ
∂r
(sn, xn) +m(C|tnk − sn|) + (tnk − sn)
)
≤
∫ tnk
sn
inf
ν∈P(V )
sup
µ∈P(U)
∫
U×V
f(xn, u, v) ·Dϕ(sn, xn)µ(du)ν(dv)dr
= (tnk − sn) inf
ν∈P(V )
sup
µ∈P(U)
∫
U×V
E[f(xn, u, v) ·Dϕ(sn, xn)]µ(du)ν(dv),
(3.48)
which means that
− (∂ϕ
∂r
(sn, xn) +m(C|tnk − sn|) + (tnk − sn)
)
≤ inf
ν∈P(V )
sup
µ∈P(U)
∫
U×V
E[f(xn, u, v) ·Dϕ(sn, xn)]µ(du)ν(dv).
(3.49)
Recall that (sn, xn)→ (t, x) and 0 ≤ (tnk − sn) ≤ (tnk − tnk−1) ≤ |πn|, when n→∞ we get
∂ϕ
∂t
(t, x) + inf
ν∈P(V )
sup
µ∈P(U)
∫
U×V
f(x, u, v) ·Dϕ(t, x)µ(du)ν(dv) ≥ 0. (3.50)
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Now we want to prove W˜ is a viscosity supersolution of the HJI equation (3.38). Notice that
−W π1 (t, x, p, q) = sup
(αi)∈(Aπ1 (t,T ))I
inf
(βj)∈(Bπ1 (t,T ))J
I∑
i=1
J∑
j=1
piqjE[−gij(Xt,x,αi,βjT )]. (3.51)
Then −W π1 (t, x, p, q) has the same form as V π1 , only change the role of players. Thus, the con-
vex conjugate −W π1 (t, x, p, q) with respect to q, i.e., −(W π#1 (t, x, p,−q¯)) satisfies a sub-dynamic
programming principle. Then similar to Lemma 3.6 and Theorem 3.8 we have the following result.
Lemma 3.9. For any (t, x, p, q¯) ∈ [0, T ]× Rn ×∆(I)× RJ , and for all l (k ≤ l ≤ n), we have
W π#1 (t, x, p, q¯) ≥ sup
α∈Aπ1 (t,tl)
inf
β∈Bπ1 (t,tl)
E[W π#1 (tl,X
t,x,α,β
tl
, p, q¯)], (3.52)
and W˜ (the limit of (W πn#1 ) on compacts) is a supersolution of the HJI equation (3.38).
We now give the definition of dual solutions for the following HJI equation{
∂V
∂t
(t, x) +H(x,DV (t, x)) = 0, (t, x) ∈ [0, T ] × Rn,
V (T, x) =
∑
i,j piqjgij(x), (p, q) ∈ ∆(I)×∆(J),
(3.53)
where H(x, ξ) = infµ∈P(U) supν∈P(V )
( ∫
U×V f(x, u, v)µ(du)ν(dv) · ξ
)
.
Definition 3.1. A function w : [0, T ]×Rn×∆(I)×∆(J) 7→ R is called a dual viscosity subsolution
of the equation (3.53) if, firstly, w is Lipschitz continuous with all its variables, convex with respect
to p and concave with respect to q, secondly, for any (p, q¯) ∈ ∆(I)×RJ , w#(t, x, p, q¯) is a viscosity
supersolution of the dual HJI equation
∂V
∂t
(t, x) +H∗(x,DV (t, x)) = 0, (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× Rn, (3.54)
where H∗(x, ξ) = −H(x,−ξ).
A function w : [0, T ] × Rn × ∆(I) × ∆(J) 7→ R is called a dual viscosity supersolution of the
equation (3.53) if, firstly, w is Lipschitz continuous with all its variables, convex with respect to
p and concave with respect to q, secondly, for any (p¯, q) ∈ RI × ∆(J), w∗(t, x, p¯, q) is a viscosity
subsolution of the dual HJI equation (3.54).
The function w is called the dual viscosity solution of the equation (3.53) if w is a dual viscosity
subsolution and a dual viscosity supersolution of the equation (3.53).
Lemma 3.10. Let w1, w2 : [0, T ] × Rn × ∆(I) × ∆(J) 7→ R be a dual viscosity subsolution and
a dual viscosity supersolution of the HJI equation (3.53), respectively. If, for all (x, p, q) ∈ Rn ×
∆(I)×∆(J), w1(T, x, p, q) ≤ w2(T, x, p, q), then we have w1 ≤ w2 on [0, T ] × Rn ×∆(I)×∆(J).
The proof of Lemma 3.10 is referred to Theorem 5.1 in [5].
Theorem 3.2. The functions (V πn1 ) and (W
πn
1 ) converge uniformly on compacts to a same Lips-
chitz continuous function U when the mesh of the partition πn tends to 0. Moreover, the function
U is the unique dual viscosity solution of the HJI equation (3.53).
For this we first prove the following proposition, then we get Theorem 3.2 directly.
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Proposition 3.1. There exists a subsequence of partitions πn with |πn| → 0, still denoted by
(πn)n≥1 such that (V πn1 ) and (W
πn
1 ) converges uniformly on compacts to the same function U , and
the function U is the unique dual viscosity solution of the HJI equation (3.53).
Remark 3.2. If Proposition 3.1 holds, then there exists a sub-subsequence (πnl) such that (V
πnl
1 ,W
πnl
1 )
converges uniformly to the function (U,U) and the limit U is the unique dual solution of the HJI
equation (3.53). Therefore, the limits of all converging sub-subsequences are the same, then Theorem
3.2 holds.
Now we prove (of Proposition 3.1).
Proof. From Lemma 3.2, using the Arzela`-Ascoli Theorem we know there exist two bounded Lip-
schitz functions V1 and W1 : [0, T ] × Rn × ∆(I) × ∆(J) 7→ R such that (V πn1 ,W πn1 ) → (V1,W1)
uniformly on compacts in [0, T ] ×Rn ×∆(I)×∆(J), and (V1,W1) are convex in p, concave in q.
From Lemma 3.7, W˜ = lim
n→∞W
πn#
1 , V˜ = limn→∞V
πn∗
1 . We know V˜
∗ and W˜# are a dual viscosity
supersolution and a dual viscosity subsolution of HJI equation (3.53), respectively, and the terminal
value V˜ ∗(T, x, p, q) = W˜#(T, x, p, q) =
∑
ij piqjgij(x). Then from Lemma 3.10, we have
V˜ ∗ ≥ W˜#, on [0, T ]× Rn ×∆(I)×∆(J). (3.55)
Since V1(t, x, p, q) = lim
n→∞V
πn
1 (t, x, p, q) for anyM > 0 and (t, x, p, q) ∈ [0, T ]×B¯M (0)×∆(I)×∆(J).
Then for any ρ > 0, we know there exists a positive integer Nρ,M , such that for any (t, x, p, q) ∈
[0, T ]× B¯M (0)×∆(I)×∆(J), it holds |V πn1 (t, x, p, q)−V1(t, x, p, q)| ≤ ρ. Thus, from the definition
of convex conjugate we have
|V πn∗1 (t, x, p¯, q)− V ∗1 (t, x, p¯, q)| = | sup
p∈∆(I)
{p¯ · p− V πn1 (t, x, p, q)} − sup
p∈∆(I)
{p¯ · p− V1(t, x, p, q)}|
≤ sup
p∈∆(I)
|V πn1 (t, x, p, q)− V1(t, x, p, q)| ≤ ρ.
Therefore, V ∗1 (t, x, p¯, q) = limn→∞V
πn∗
1 (t, x, p¯, q). Therefore, V˜ = limn→∞V
πn∗
1 = V
∗
1 , since V1 is convex
in p, we have V1 = V
∗∗
1 = V˜
∗. Similarly, we have W1 = W˜#. From (3.55) we have
W1 ≤ V1, on [0, T ]× Rn ×∆(I)×∆(J). (3.56)
On the other hand, knowing that W πn1 ≥ V πn1 , we have
W1 ≥ V1, on [0, T ]× Rn ×∆(I)×∆(J). (3.57)
From (3.56) and (3.57), we know that U := V1 = W1 on [0, T ] × Rn ×∆(I)×∆(J). Furthermore,
from the above proof, we also know that U is the unique dual viscosity solution of HJI equation
(3.53).
From Theorem 3.1 and Theorem 3.2, we obtain the following result directly.
Theorem 3.3. The functions (V πn) and (W πn) converge uniformly on compacts to a same Lips-
chitz continuous function U when the mesh of the partition πn tends to 0. Moreover, the function
U is the unique dual viscosity solution of the HJI equation (3.53).
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4 Nash equilibrium payoffs for nonzero-sum differential games with symmetric
information and without Isaacs condition
In this section we consider the existence of Nash equilibrium payoffs for nonzero-sum differential
games with symmetric information (i.e., I = J = 1) and without Isaacs condition. From Theorem
3.1, we only need to consider the strategies α ∈ Aπ1 (t, T ) and β ∈ Bπ1 (t, T ) for our nonzero-sum
games. Let g1 : R
n 7→ R and g2 : Rn 7→ R be two bounded Lipschitz continuous functions. For
(t, x) ∈ [0, T ] × Rn, (u, v) ∈ Uπ,1t,T × Vπ,1t,T (the definition of Uπ,1t,T and Vπ,1t,T refer to Remark 2.2), we
define
J1(t, x, u, v) = E[g1(X
t,x,u,v
T )] and J2(t, x, u, v) = E[g2(X
t,x,u,v
T )], (4.1)
where Xt,x,u,v is the solution of the equation (2.1). From Remark 2.1, we know for any (α, β) ∈
Aπ1 (t, T )× Bπ1 (t, T ), there exists (u, v) ∈ Uπ,1t,T × Vπ,1t,T , such that α(v) = u, β(u) = v. Thus, we have
Jm(t, x, α, β) = Jm(t, x, u, v), m = 1, 2, respectively.
Here, for the nonzero-sum differential games Player I wants to maximize J1(t, x, α, β), while
Player II wants to maximize J2(t, x, α, β). In general, a Nash equilibrium point is a couple strategies
(α¯, β¯) such that for any other couples of strategies (α, β), it holds
J1(t, x, α¯, β¯) ≥ J1(t, x, α, β¯), and J2(t, x, α¯, β¯) ≥ J2(t, x, α¯, β), (4.2)
and the pair (J1(t, x, α¯, β¯), J2(t, x, α¯, β¯)) is called a Nash equilibrium payoff.
In our paper, we only concern the existence of the Nash equilibrium payoff which can be
approximated by (J1(t, x, α¯
ǫ, β¯ǫ), J2(t, x, α¯
ǫ, β¯ǫ)) when ǫ tends to 0. Now we first give the definition
of a Nash equilibrium payoff for our nonzero-sum differential games.
Definition 4.1. A couple (e1, e2) ∈ R2 is called a Nash equilibrium payoff (NEP, for short) at
the position (t, x), if for any ǫ > 0, there exists δǫ small enough satisfying that for any partition
π of the interval [0, T ] with |π| ≤ δǫ, there exist (αǫ, βǫ) ∈ Aπ1 (t, T ) × Bπ1 (t, T ) such that for all
(α, β) ∈ Aπ1 (t, T )× Bπ1 (t, T )
J1(t, x, α
ǫ, βǫ) ≥ J1(t, x, α, βǫ)− ǫ and J2(t, x, αǫ, βǫ) ≥ J2(t, x, αǫ, β)− ǫ, (4.3)
and
for m = 1, 2, |Jm(t, x, αǫ, βǫ)− em| ≤ ǫ, respectively. (4.4)
The following lemma gives an equivalent condition of assumption (4.3) which will be frequently
used in this section.
Lemma 4.1. We assume ǫ > 0 and (αǫ, βǫ) ∈ Aπ1 (t, T )× Bπ1 (t, T ). Assumption (4.3) holds if and
only if for any (u, v) ∈ Uπ,1t,T × Vπ,1t,T ,
J1(t, x, α
ǫ, βǫ) ≥ J1(t, x, u, βǫ(u)) − ǫ and J2(t, x, αǫ, βǫ) ≥ J2(t, x, αǫ(v), v) − ǫ. (4.5)
Proof. We assume (4.3) holds, then for any fixed u ∈ Uπ,1t,T , we define α(v) ≡ u, for all v ∈ Vπ,1t,T , then
we know α ∈ Aπ1 (t, T ). Thus, from condition (4.3), we have J1(t, x, αǫ, βǫ) ≥ J1(t, x, u, βǫ(u)) − ǫ.
Similarly, for any v ∈ Vπ,1t,T , we obtain J2(t, x, αǫ, βǫ) ≥ J2(t, x, αǫ(v), v) − ǫ, then condition (4.5)
holds.
Conversely now (4.5) holds, for any α ∈ Aπ1 (t, T ), from Remark 2.2, there exists (u, v) ∈
Uπ,1t,T × Vπ,1t,T such that, α(v) = u, βǫ(u) = v. Then we know
J1(t, x, α, β
ǫ)− ǫ = J1(t, x, u, βǫ(u))− ǫ ≤ J1(t, x, αǫ, βǫ).
Similarly to J2, then we get condition (4.3).
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From Theorem 3.2 we know the upper value function W π1 and the lower value function V
π
1
converge to the same function without Isaacs condition. Thus we can denote the following functions
U1(t, x) and U2(t, x):
U1(t, x) = lim|π|→0
inf
β∈Bπ1 (t,T )
sup
α∈Aπ1 (t,T )
J1(t, x, α, β) = lim|π|→0
sup
α∈Aπ1 (t,T )
inf
β∈Bπ1 (t,T )
J1(t, x, α, β), (4.6)
and similarly,
U2(t, x) = lim|π|→0
sup
β∈Bπ1 (t,T )
inf
α∈Aπ1 (t,T )
J2(t, x, α, β) = lim|π|→0
inf
α∈Aπ1 (t,T )
sup
β∈Bπ1 (t,T )
J2(t, x, α, β). (4.7)
Now we announce the following two important results for our nonzero-sum differential games.
Theorem 4.1. (Characterization) A couple (e1, e2) ∈ R2 is a NEP at the position (t, x) if and only
if for any ǫ > 0, there exists δǫ satisfying that for any partition π = {0 = t0 < t1 < · · · < tN = T}
with |π| < δǫ and t = tk−1, there exists (uǫ, vǫ) ∈ Uπ,1t,T × Vπ,1t,T such that for i = k, . . . ,N and
m = 1, 2, respectively,
P
{
E[gm(X
t,x,uǫ,vǫ
T )|Ftk−2,ti−2 ] ≥ Um(ti−1,Xt,x,u
ǫ,vǫ
ti−1
)− ǫ} ≥ 1− ǫ, (4.8)
and
|E[gm(Xt,x,u
ǫ,vǫ
T )]− em| ≤ ǫ. (4.9)
Theorem 4.2. For any initial position (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× Rn, there exists some NEP at the position
(t, x).
The rest of this section mainly gives the proof for the above theorems, we first prove Theorem
4.1 and then from this characterization, we prove the existence result (Theorem 4.2). First of all,
we give the following lemma which will be used to prove Theorem 4.1 and 4.2.
Lemma 4.2. a) Fix (t, x) ∈ [0, T ] × Rn. For any ǫ > 0, for any partition π = {0 = t0 < t1 <
· · · < tN = T} with |π| < δǫ (small enough) and t = tk−1, any fixed u′ ∈ Uπ,1t,T , there exist strategies
αi ∈ Aπ1 (t, T ), i = k, . . . ,N , such that for any v ∈ Vπ,1t,T ,
αi(v) ≡ u′, P -a.s., on [t, ti−1],
E[g2(X
t,x,αi(v),v
T )|Ftk−2,ti−2 ] ≤ U2(ti−1,Xt,x,α
i(v),v
ti−1
) + ǫ, P -a.s.
(4.10)
b) Fix (t, x) ∈ [0, T ] × Rn. For any ǫ > 0, for any partition π = {0 = t0 < t1 < · · · < tN = T}
with |π| < δǫ (small enough) and t = tk−1, any fixed u′ ∈ Uπ,1t,T , there exist strategies αi ∈ Aπ1 (t, T ),
i = k, . . . ,N , such that for any v ∈ Vπ,1t,T ,
αi(v) ≡ u′, P -a.s., on [t, ti−1],
E[g1(X
t,x,αi(v),v
T )|Ftk−2,ti−2 ] ≥ U1(ti−1,Xt,x,α
i(v),v
ti−1
)− ǫ, P -a.s. (4.11)
Proof. We just give the proof for a), the proof of b) is analogous.
For any ǫ > 0, y ∈ Rn, any fixed i, from the definition of the value function U2, there exists a
strategy αiy ∈ Aπ1 (ti−1, T ) such that
U2(ti−1, y) = lim|π|→0
inf
α∈Aπ1 (ti−1,T )
sup
β∈Bπ1 (ti−1,T )
E[g2(X
ti−1,y,α,β
T )]
≥ inf
α∈Aπ1 (ti−1,T )
sup
β∈Bπ1 (ti−1,T )
E[g2(X
ti−1,y,α,β
T )]−
ǫ
4
(since |π| < δǫ)
≥ inf
α∈Aπ1 (ti−1,T )
sup
v∈Vπ,1ti−1,T
E[g2(X
ti−1,y,α(v),v
T )]−
ǫ
4
≥ sup
v∈Vπ,1ti−1,T
E[g2(X
ti−1,y,α
i
y(v),v
T )]−
ǫ
2
.
(4.12)
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Since the coefficient f is bounded, for any (u, v) ∈ Uπ,1t,T × Vπ,1t,T , there exists a constant R > 0 such
that |Xt,x,u,v| ≤ R. Then there exists a finite partition (Ol)l=1,2,...,n of the closed ball B¯R(0) with
diam(Ol) ≤ ǫupslope(4C). For any l, from (4.12) there is some yl ∈ Ol with
∀z ∈ Ol, sup
v∈Vπ,1ti−1,T
E[g2(X
ti−1,z,α
i
yl
(v),v
T )] ≤ U2(ti−1, z) + ǫ, (4.13)
since U2(ti−1, z) and supv∈Vπ,1ti−1,T
E[g2(X
ti−1,z,α
i
yl
(v),v
T )] are Lipschitz continuous with respect to z.
For any v ∈ Vπ,1t,T , from the definition of the control v, it has the following form (refer to Remark
2.2)
v(ω, s) = vk(s, ζπ2,k−1)I[t,tk)(s) +
N∑
l=k+1
vl(s, ζπk−1, . . . , ζ
π
l−2, ζ
π
2,l−1)I[tl−1,tl)(s), (4.14)
then for s ∈ [ti−1, T ] we define
v′′(ω,Q, s) =
N∑
l=i
vl(s,Q, ζπ2,i−1, ζ
π
1,i−1, ζ
π
2,i, . . . , ζ
π
2,l−1)I[tl−1,tl)(s), (4.15)
where Q is a 2(i− k)-dimensional constant vector. Therefore, v′′ ∈ Vπ,1ti−1,T , and we define the
following strategy αi,
∀v ∈ Vπ,1t,T , αi(v) :=
{
u′, on [t, ti−1],
αiyl(v
′′(Q0, s)), on (ti−1, T ]× {Xt,x,u
′,v
ti−1
∈ Ol}, (4.16)
where Q0 = (ζ
π
2,k−1, ζ
π
1,k−1, . . . , ζ
π
2,i−2, ζ
π
1,i−2). Then, α
i ∈ Aπ1 (t, T ). Notice that Q0 and Xt,x,u
′,v
ti−1
are
all Ftk−2,ti−2-measurable, v′′(Q, s) and αiyl(v′′(Q, s)) are all Fti−2,T -measurable. Therefore, for all
v ∈ Vπ,1t,T from (4.13) we have, P -a.s.,
E[g2(X
t,x,αi(v),v
T )|Ftk−2,ti−2 ] =
n∑
l=1
E[g2(X
ti−1,z,α
i
yl
(v′′(Q,s)),v′′(Q,s)
T )]Q=Q0,z=Xt,x,u
′,v
ti−1
· I{Xt,x,u′,vti−1 ∈Ol}
≤
n∑
l=1
U2(ti−1,X
t,x,u′,v
ti−1
) · I{Xt,x,u′,vti−1 ∈Ol}
+ ǫ = U2(ti−1,X
t,x,αi(v),v
ti−1
) + ǫ.
(4.17)
Now with the help of Lemma 4.2, we will prove Theorem 4.1.
Proof. Sufficient condition.
Let us assume that (e1, e2) satisfies condition (4.8) and (4.9) of Theorem 4.1, namely, for any
ǫ > 0, there exists δǫ small enough satisfying that for any partition π = {0 = t0 < t1 < · · · < tN =
T} with |π| < δǫ and t = tk−1, there exists (uǫ, vǫ) ∈ Uπ,1t,T × Vπ,1t,T such that for i = k, . . . ,N and
m = 1, 2,
P
{
E[gm(X
t,x,uǫ,vǫ
T )|Ftk−2,ti−2 ] ≥ Um(ti−1,Xt,x,u
ǫ,vǫ
ti−1
)− ǫ} ≥ 1− ǫ, (4.18)
22
and
|E[gm(Xt,x,u
ǫ,vǫ
T )]− em| ≤ ǫ. (4.19)
Then we will prove that (e1, e2) is a NEP for the initial position (t, x). For this, we construct
(αǫ, βǫ) ∈ Aπ1 (t, T )× Bπ1 (t, T ) satisfying (4.3) and (4.4).
Since gm,m = 1, 2, is bounded, without loss of generality, we assume gm ≥ 0, which means
Wm ≥ 0, for m = 1, 2, respectively. Suppose ǫ0 = ǫ8+4NC and (u¯, v¯) = (uǫ0 , vǫ0), then (4.18) and
4.19 also hold for ǫ = ǫ0. From Lemma 4.2 a), let u
′ := u¯, there exist strategies αi ∈ Aπ1 (t, T ),
i = k, . . . ,N , such that for any v ∈ Vπ,1t,T ,
αi(v) ≡ u¯, P -a.s., on [t, ti−1],
E[g2(X
t,x,αi(v),v
T )|Ftk−2,ti−2 ] ≤ U2(ti−1,Xt,x,αi(v),vti−1 ) + ǫ8 , P -a.s.
(4.20)
For any v ∈ Vπ,1t,T , we introduce the stopping times Sv = inf{s|vs 6= v¯s, t ≤ s ≤ T} ∧ T , τv =
inf{ti−1|ti−1 > Sv, k + 1 ≤ i ≤ N} ∧ T . Now we define αǫ as follows:
∀v ∈ Vπ,1t,T , αǫ(v) =
{
u¯, on [[t, τv ]],
αi(v), on (ti−1, T ]× {τv = ti−1}. (4.21)
Then αǫ ∈ Aπ1 (t, T ). Furthermore, for any v ∈ Vπ,1t,T ,
Xt,x,α
ǫ(v),v =
{
Xt,x,u¯,v, on [[t, τv]], P -a.s.,∑N
i=k+1X
t,x,αi(v),v · I{τv=ti−1}, on [[τv, T ]], P -a.s.
(4.22)
Then, since {τv = ti−1} ∈ Ftk−2,ti−2 from (4.20) we get
E[g2(X
t,x,αǫ(v),v
T )|Ftk−2,τv ] ≤ U2(τv,Xt,x,α
ǫ(v),v
τv ) +
ǫ
8
, P -a.s. (4.23)
Taking expectation on both side we have
J2(t, x, α
ǫ(v), v) ≤ E[U2(τv,Xt,x,α
ǫ(v),v
τv )] +
ǫ
8
. (4.24)
Since X
t,x,αǫ(v),v
Sv = X
t,x,u¯,v¯
Sv and the coefficient f is bounded, for ρ := |π| > 0, we have
E[ sup
0≤r≤ρ
|Xt,x,αǫ(v),v(Sv+r)∧T −Xt,x,u¯,v¯(Sv+r)∧T |] ≤ Cρ.
Moreover, since U2(s, x) is Lipschitz in x, and S
v ≤ τv ≤ Sv + ρ, then we have
E[|U2(τv ,Xt,x,α
ǫ(v),v
τv )− U2(τv,Xt,x,u¯,v¯τv )|] ≤ Cρ ≤
ǫ
8
. (4.25)
From (4.24) and (4.25), we have
J2(t, x, α
ǫ(v), v) ≤ E[U2(τv,Xt,x,u¯,v¯τv )] +
ǫ
4
. (4.26)
Now we denote
Ωi :=
{
E[g2(X
t,x,u¯,v¯
T )|Ftk−2,ti−2 ] ≥ U2(ti−1,Xt,x,u¯,v¯ti−1 )− ǫ0
}
, (4.27)
23
and from (4.18), we have P (Ωi) ≥ 1− ǫ0. Thus, from (4.26), (4.27) and (4.19), we have
J2(t, x, α
ǫ(v), v)
≤
N∑
i=k+1
E[U2(ti−1,Xti−1) · I{τv=ti−1} · IΩi ] +
N∑
i=k+1
E[U2(ti−1,Xti−1) · I{τv=ti−1} · IΩci ] +
ǫ
4
≤
N∑
i=k+1
E[(E[g2(XT )|Ftk−2,ti−2 ] + ǫ0) · I{τv=ti−1} · 1Ωi ] +
N∑
i=k+1
CP (Ωci ∩ {τv = ti−1}) +
ǫ
4
≤ E[g2(XT )] + ǫ0 +
N∑
i=k+1
CP (Ωci ) +
ǫ
4
≤ e2 + (2 +NC)ǫ0 + ǫ
4
= e2 +
ǫ
2
,
(4.28)
where X. := X
t,x,u¯,v¯
. . Then from (4.28) and (4.21) we obtain
∀v ∈ Vπ,1t,T , J2(t, x, αǫ(v), v) ≤ e2 +
ǫ
2
, and αǫ(v¯) = u¯. (4.29)
Similarly, we can construct βǫ ∈ Bπ1 (t, T ) such that
∀u ∈ Uπ,1t,T , J1(t, x, u, βǫ(u)) ≤ e1 +
ǫ
2
, and βǫ(u¯) = v¯. (4.30)
From (4.29), (4.30) and (4.19), we have, for m = 1, 2, respectively,
|Jm(t, x, αǫ, βǫ)− em| = |Jm(t, x, u¯, v¯)− em| ≤ ǫ
2
, (4.31)
namely, we obtain (4.4). From (4.31) we know, for m = 1, 2, respectively,
em ≤ Jm(t, x, αǫ, βǫ) + ǫ
2
. (4.32)
From (4.29), (4.30) and (4.32), we have
J2(t, x, α
ǫ(v), v) ≤ e2 + ǫ
2
≤ J2(t, x, αǫ, βǫ) + ǫ,
J1(t, x, u, β
ǫ(u)) ≤ e1 + ǫ
2
≤ J1(t, x, αǫ, βǫ) + ǫ.
From Lemma 4.1, we know (4.3) holds.
Necessary condition.
We assume there exists a NEP (e1, e2) ∈ R2 at the position (t, x), i.e., for any ǫ > 0, there exists
δǫ small enough satisfying that for any partition π = {0 = t0 < . . . < tN = T} with |π| < δǫ and
t = tk−1, there exists (αǫ, βǫ) ∈ Aπ1 (t, T ) × Bπ1 (t, T ) be such that for any (u, v) ∈ Uπ,1t,T × Vπ,1t,T , the
following inequalities hold:
J1(t, x, α
ǫ, βǫ) ≥ J1(t, x, u, βǫ(u))− ǫ
2
2
and J2(t, x, α
ǫ, βǫ) ≥ J2(t, x, αǫ(v), v) − ǫ
2
2
, (4.33)
and for m = 1, 2, respectively,
|Jm(t, x, αǫ, βǫ)− em| ≤ ǫ
2
2
. (4.34)
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From Remark 2.1, we know there exist (uǫ, vǫ) ∈ Uπ,1t,T × Vπ,1t,T , such that αǫ(vǫ) = uǫ, βǫ(uǫ) = vǫ.
Now we see (4.9) holds obviously. We suppose (4.8) doesn’t hold, then we assume that there is
some j ∈ {k, . . . ,N}, without loss of generality, we consider the case m = 1 such that
P
{
E[g1(X
t,x,uǫ,vǫ
T )|Ftk−2,tj−2 ] < U1(tj−1,Xt,x,u
ǫ,vǫ
tj−1
)− ǫ} > ǫ. (4.35)
Define
A =
{
E[g1(X
t,x,uǫ,vǫ
T )|Ftk−2,tj−2 ] < U1(tj−1,Xt,x,u
ǫ,vǫ
tj−1
)− ǫ}. (4.36)
From Lemma 4.2 b), let u′ := uǫ ∈ Uπ,1t,T , then there exist a strategy α ∈ Aπ1 (t, T ) such that, for any
v ∈ Vπ,1t,T , α(v) = uǫ, on [t, tj−1], P -a.s., and
E[g1(X
t,x,α(v),v
T )|Ftk−2,tj−2 ] ≥ U1(tj−1,Xt,x,α(v),vtj−1 )−
ǫ
2
. (4.37)
For (α, βǫ) ∈ Aπ1 (t, T ) × Bπ1 (t, T ), there exists a pair (u, v) ∈ Uπ,1t,T × Vπ,1t,T , such that α(v) = u,
βǫ(u) = v. Notice that u ≡ uǫ, v ≡ vǫ, on [t, tj−1]. Define u¯ by setting:
u¯ =
{
uǫ, on
(
[t, tj−1]× Ω
) ∪ ([tj−1, T ]×Ac),
u, on [tj−1, T ]×A.
Obviously, u¯ ∈ Uπt,T .
And we know βǫ(u¯) ≡ vǫ, on [t, tj−1), and for s ∈ [tj−1, T ], βǫ(u¯)s =
{
vs, on A,
vǫs, on A
c.
Then, we haveXt,x,u¯,β
ǫ(u¯) ≡ Xt,x,uǫ,vǫ , on [t, tj−1]. For s ∈ [tj−1, T ], Xt,x,u¯,β
ǫ(u¯)
s =
{
X
t,x,α(v),v
s , on A,
Xt,x,u
ǫ,vǫ
s , on Ac.
Furthermore, we have
J1(t, x, u¯, β
ǫ(u¯)) = E[g1(X
t,x,uǫ,vǫ
T ) · IAc ] + E[g1(Xt,x,α(v),vT ) · IA]
= E[g1(X
t,x,uǫ,vǫ
T ) · IAc ] + E[E[g1(Xt,x,α(v),vT )|Ftk−2,tj−2 ] · IA]
≥ E[g1(Xt,x,u
ǫ,vǫ
T ) · IAc ] + E[U1(tj−1,Xt,x,α(v),vtj−1 ) · IA]−
ǫ
2
P (A) (from (4.37))
≥ E[g1(Xt,x,u
ǫ,vǫ
T )] +
ǫ
2
P (A) (from (4.36))
> J1(t, x, α
ǫ, βǫ) +
ǫ2
2
, (from (4.35) and (4.36))
(4.38)
which is in contradiction with (4.33). Therefore, (4.8) holds.
To prove Theorem 4.2 we only need to prove that for any ǫ > 0, there exists δǫ small enough
satisfying that for any partition π = {0 = t0 < t1 < · · · < tN = T} with |π| < δǫ and t = tk−1,
there is a pair (uǫ, vǫ) satisfying the conditions of Theorem 4.1. For this we show a stronger result.
Proposition 4.1. For any ǫ > 0, there exists δǫ small enough satisfying that for any partition
π = {0 = t0 < t1 < · · · < tN = T} with |π| < δǫ and t = tk−1, there exist a pair (uǫ, vǫ) ∈ Uπ,1t,T ×Vπ,1t,T ,
such that, for any k ≤ i ≤ l ≤ N , and m = 1, 2, respectively,
E[Um(tl,Xtl)|Ftk−2,ti−2 ] ≥ Um(ti−1,Xti−1)− ǫ, P -a.s., (4.39)
where X. = X
t,x,uǫ,vǫ
. .
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Remark 4.1. If Proposition 4.1 holds, then we set l = N , we have Um(T, x) = gm(x), i.e.,
Um(T,X
t,x,uǫ,vǫ
T ) = gm(X
t,x,uǫ,vǫ
T ), then we know the pair (u
ǫ, vǫ) satisfy the conditions of Theorem
4.1, let ǫ→ 0, we obtain the NEP (e1, e2).
We first give the following lemma.
Lemma 4.3. For any ǫ > 0, there exists δǫ small enough satisfying that for any partition π = {0 =
t0 < t1 < · · · < tN = T} with |π| < δǫ and t = tk−1, there exists a pair (uǫ, vǫ) ∈ Uπ,1t,T × Vπ,1t,T , such
that, for m = 1, 2, respectively,
E[Um(tk,X
t,x,uǫ,vǫ
tk
)] ≥ Um(t, x)− ǫ. (4.40)
Proof. From the definition of U1(t, x) and U2(t, x) (refer to (4.6) and (4.7)), there is some δǫ such
that when |π| < δǫ
U1(t, x) = lim|π|→0
sup
α∈Aπ1 (t,T )
inf
β∈Bπ1 (t,T )
J1(t, x, α, β) ≤ sup
α∈Aπ1 (t,T )
inf
β∈Bπ1 (t,T )
J1(t, x, α, β) +
ǫ
4
,
U2(t, x) = lim|π|→0
sup
β∈Bπ1 (t,T )
inf
α∈Aπ1 (t,T )
J2(t, x, α, β) ≤ sup
β∈Bπ1 (t,T )
inf
α∈Aπ1 (t,T )
J2(t, x, α, β) +
ǫ
4
.
Then we choose αǫ ∈ Aπ1 (t, T ) and βǫ ∈ Bπ1 (t, T ) such that
U1(t, x) ≤ inf
β∈Bπ1 (t,T )
J1(t, x, α
ǫ, β) +
ǫ
2
≤ inf
v∈Vπ,1
t,T
J1(t, x, α
ǫ(v), v) +
ǫ
2
,
U2(t, x) ≤ inf
α∈Aπ1 (t,T )
J2(t, x, α, β
ǫ) +
ǫ
2
≤ inf
u∈Uπ,1t,T
J2(t, x, u, β
ǫ(u)) +
ǫ
2
.
(4.41)
For (αǫ, βǫ), from Remark 2.1 there exists a unique pair (uǫ, vǫ) such that, αǫ(vǫ) = uǫ, βǫ(uǫ) = vǫ.
Now we want to prove that (uǫ, vǫ) satisfy (4.40). For this, we suppose (4.40) doesn’t hold, i.e., for
m = 2 (m = 1, similar) such that
E[U2(tk,X
t,x,uǫ,vǫ
tk
)] < U2(t, x)− ǫ. (4.42)
From Lemma 4.2 a), for u′ := uǫ, there exists a NAD strategy α ∈ Aπ1 (t, T ), for any v ∈ Vπ,1t,T , such
that α(v) = uǫ, P -a.s., on [t, tk], and
E[g2(X
t,x,α(v),v
T )|Ftk−2,tk−1 ] ≤ U2(tk,Xt,x,α(v),vtk ) +
ǫ
2
, P -a.s. (4.43)
From Remark 2.1 we know there exists a couple (u¯, v¯) ∈ Uπ,1t,T ×Vπ,1t,T such that, α(v¯) = u¯, βǫ(u¯) = v¯.
Since u¯ ≡ uǫ, v¯ ≡ vǫ, on [t, tk], we know Xt,x,u¯,v¯tk = X
t,x,α(v¯),v¯
tk
= Xt,x,u
ǫ,vǫ
tk
, P -a.s.
From (4.43) and (4.42), it follows that
J2(t, x, u¯, β
ǫ(u¯)) = J2(t, x, α(v¯), v¯) = E[E[g2(X
t,x,α(v¯),v¯
T )|Ftk−2,tk−1 ]]
≤E[U2(tk,Xt,x,α(v¯),v¯tk )] +
ǫ
2
< U2(t, x)− ǫ
2
,
(4.44)
which is contradictory to (4.41). Hence, (4.40) holds.
We now give the proof of Proposition 4.1.
Proof. Firstly, we show that when l = i, Proposition 4.1 holds.
Similar to Lemma 4.3, we know for any ǫ > 0, there exists δǫ small enough satisfying that for any
partition π = {0 = t0 < t1 < · · · < tN = T} with |π| < δǫ and t = tk−1, for any y ∈ Rn there exist
(uǫ,yj , v
ǫ,y
j ) ∈ Uπ,1tj ,T × V
π,1
tj ,T
, j = k − 1, . . . , N − 1, such that for m = 1, 2, respectively,
E[Um(tj+1,X
tj ,y,u
ǫ,y
j ,v
ǫ,y
j
tj+1
)] ≥ Um(tj , y)− ǫ. (4.45)
For the partition π with |π| < δǫ, we now give the construction of (uǫ, vǫ) ∈ Uπ,1t,T ×Vπ,1t,T by induction
on [ti−1, ti) satisfying, for i = k, . . . ,N ,
E[Um(ti,X
t,x,uǫ,vǫ
ti
)|Ftk−2,ti−2 ] ≥ Um(ti−1,Xt,x,u
ǫ,vǫ
ti−1
)− ǫ, P -a.s.. (4.46)
For i = k, from (4.45) we know there is (uǫ,xk−1, v
ǫ,x
k−1) satisfying (4.46). We define u
ǫ|[tk−1,tk) := uǫ,xk−1,
vǫ|[tk−1,tk) := vǫ,xk−1.
For i = k + 1, from (4.45) we know for any y ∈ Rn, there is (uǫ,yk , vǫ,yk ) ∈ Uπ,1tk,T × V
π,1
tk ,T
such that,
for m = 1, 2, respectively,
E[Um(tk+1,X
tk ,y,u
ǫ,y
k ,v
ǫ,y
k
tk+1
)] ≥ Um(tk, y)− ǫ
2
. (4.47)
Since the coefficient f is bounded, there is some R > 0 such that |Xt,x,uǫ,vǫtk | < R. Then there
exists a finite Borel partition (Ol)
n
l=1 of B¯R(0). From (4.47), we have for any z ∈ Ol, there is some
yl ∈ Ol, such that
E[Um(tk+1,X
tk ,z,u
ǫ,yl
k
,v
ǫ,yl
k
tk+1
)] ≥ Um(tk, z)− ǫ. (4.48)
Now we define uǫ|[tk ,tk+1) :=
n∑
l=1
uǫ,ylk I{Xt,x,uǫ,vǫtk ∈Ol}
, vǫ|[tk,tk+1) :=
n∑
l=1
vǫ,ylk I{Xt,x,uǫ,vǫtk ∈Ol}
. Then from
(4.48) we have
E[Um(tk+1,X
t,x,uǫ,vǫ
tk+1
)|Ftk−2,tk−1 ] =
n∑
l=1
E[Um(tk+1,X
tk ,z,u
ǫ,yl
k ,v
ǫ,yl
k
tk+1
)]
z=Xt,x,u
ǫ,vǫ
tk
I{Xt,x,uǫ,vǫtk ∈Ol}
≥
n∑
l=1
[Um(tk, z)− ǫ]z=Xt,x,uǫ,vǫtk I{Xt,x,u
ǫ,vǫ
tk
∈Ol} = Um(tk,X
t,x,uǫ,vǫ
tk
)− ǫ, P -a.s.
(4.49)
Repeating the above step, we can get (uǫ, vǫ) ∈ Uπ,1t,T × Vπ,1t,T satisfying (4.46).
Next for l > i, from (4.46) with using ǫ := ǫ
N
we get
E[Um(tl,X
t,x,uǫ,vǫ
tl
)|Ftk−2,ti−2 ] = E[E[Um(tl,Xt,x,u
ǫ,vǫ
tl
)|Ftk−2,tl−2 ]|Ftk−2,ti−2 ]
≥ E[Um(tl−1,Xt,x,u
ǫ,vǫ
tl−1
)|Ftk−2,ti−2 ]−
ǫ
N
· · · = Um(ti−1,Xt,x,u
ǫ,vǫ
ti−1
)− ǫ, P -a.s. (4.50)
5 Characterization for the functions W (t, x, p, q) and V (t, x, p, q)
This section mainly gives a characterization forW (t, x, p, q) and V (t, x, p, q). Under some equivalent
Isaacs condition, we prove that W (t, x, p, q) = V (t, x, p, q). This characterization guarantees that
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we can consider the discrete case (with the strategies along the partition π) for some indiscrete zero-
sum differential games with asymmetric information. With this property, we provide a new method
to calculate the value of the zero-sum differential games through considering all the partitions.
For simplicity, we only consider the case that Player I and II have no private information in a
small time from beginning, then they observe each other and only know the opponent’s probability,
i.e., along with the partition π = {0 = t0 < t1 < . . . < tN = T}, tk−1 ≤ t < tk, the strategy
α : Ω× [t, T ]× Vt,T → Ut,T of Player I has the following form
α(ω, v)(s) = αk(v)(s)I[t,tk)(s) +
N∑
l=k+1
αl((ζ
π
1,k, ζ
π
2,k, ζ
π
1,k+1, . . . , ζ
π
1,l−1)(ω), v)I[tl−1,tl)(s), s ∈ [t, T ],
where αk : [t, tk) × Vt,T 7→ Ut,T , αl : R2(l−k)−1 × [tl−1, tl) × Vt,T 7→ Ut,T , k + 1 ≤ l ≤ N , are Borel
measurable functions satisfying: For all v, v′ ∈ Vt,T , it holds that, whenever v = v′ a.e. on [t, tl−1],
we have for all x ∈ R2(l−k)−1, αl(x, v)(s) = αl(x, v′)(s), a.e. on [tl−1, tl], k + 1 ≤ l ≤ N .
Obviously, the strategy α such defined is a special case of Definition 2.1, still denoted by Aπ(t, T ) for
the set of the strategy α that have the above form. Similarly, we have the definition for the strategy
β and for the set we still denoted by Bπ(t, T ). Obviously, for π′ ⊂ π, we have Aπ′(t, T ) ⊂ Aπ(t, T ).
A(t, T ) and B(t, T ) are the union of Aπ(t, T ) and Bπ(t, T ) with all partition π, respectively. It
is noticed that the strategies used in this section have the above forms, the rest corresponding
definitions are the same with that defined in Section 2.
To give the characterization, we introduce the following upper and lower value functions as
follows
W¯ π(t, x, p, q) = inf
αˆ∈(Aπ(t,T ))I
sup
βˆ∈(B(t,T ))J
J(t, x, αˆ, βˆ, p, q), (5.1)
V¯ π(t, x, p, q) = sup
βˆ∈(B(t,T ))J
inf
αˆ∈(Aπ(t,T ))I
J(t, x, αˆ, βˆ, p, q), (5.2)
W¯ π(t, x, p, q) = inf
αˆ∈(A(t,T ))I
sup
βˆ∈(Bπ(t,T ))J
J(t, x, αˆ, βˆ, p, q), (5.3)
V¯ π(t, x, p, q) = sup
βˆ∈(Bπ(t,T ))J
inf
αˆ∈(A(t,T ))I
J(t, x, αˆ, βˆ, p, q). (5.4)
Next we first prove (W¯ π(t, x, p, q), V¯ π(t, x, p, q)) and (W¯ π(t, x, p, q), V¯ π(t, x, p, q)) converge uni-
formly on compacts to the same couple (U(t, x, p, q), U(t, x, p, q)), as |π| → 0, under the condition
inf
u∈U
sup
ν∈P(V )
f(x, u, ν) · ξ = sup
ν∈P(V )
inf
u∈U
f(x, u, ν) · ξ, (5.5)
sup
v∈V
inf
µ∈P(U)
f(x, µ, v) · ξ = inf
µ∈P(U)
sup
v∈V
f(x, µ, v) · ξ, (5.6)
respectively, where f(x, µ, v) :=
∫
U
f(x, u, v)µ(du), f(x, u, ν) :=
∫
V
f(x, u, v)ν(dv), and the function
U(t, x, p, q) is the unique solution of the HJI equation (3.53). Then we show that the functions
W (t, x, p, q) = U(t, x, p, q) = V (t, x, p, q) under the conditions (5.5) and (5.6).
Remark 5.1. The assumptions (5.5) and (5.6) hold, if and only if the following classical Isaacs
condition holds:
inf
u∈U
sup
v∈V
f(x, u, v) · ξ = sup
v∈V
inf
u∈U
f(x, u, v) · ξ. (5.7)
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Indeed, we have
inf
µ∈P(U)
f(x, µ, v) · ξ = inf
µ∈P(U)
∫
U
f(x, u, v) · ξdµ(u) ≥ inf
u∈U
f(x, u, v) · ξ ≥ inf
µ∈P(U)
f(x, µ, v) · ξ,
hence, inf
µ∈P(U)
f(x, µ, v) · ξ = inf
u∈U
f(x, u, v) · ξ. Similarly, sup
ν∈P(V )
f(x, u, ν) · ξ = sup
v∈V
f(x, u, v) · ξ.
If (5.5) and (5.6) hold, then we have
inf
u∈U
sup
v∈V
f(x, u, v) ·ξ = inf
u∈U
sup
ν∈P(V )
f(x, u, ν) ·ξ = sup
ν∈P(V )
inf
u∈U
f(x, u, ν) ·ξ = sup
ν∈P(V )
inf
µ∈P(U)
f(x, µ, ν) ·ξ.
sup
v∈V
inf
u∈U
f(x, u, v) ·ξ = sup
v∈V
inf
µ∈P(U)
f(x, µ, v) ·ξ = inf
µ∈P(U)
sup
v∈V
f(x, µ, v) ·ξ = inf
µ∈P(U)
sup
ν∈P(V )
f(x, µ, ν) ·ξ.
Then, we get classical Isaacs condition (5.7) holds.
If (5.7) holds, then we have
inf
u∈U
sup
ν∈P(V )
f(x, u, ν) · ξ = inf
u∈U
sup
v∈V
f(x, u, v) · ξ = sup
v∈V
inf
u∈U
f(x, u, v) · ξ = sup
ν∈P(V )
inf
u∈U
f(x, u, ν) · ξ,
then we know (5.5) holds. Similarly, we get (5.6).
Similar to the proof of Theorem 3.2, we get the following result.
Theorem 5.1. The functions (V πn) and (W πn) converge uniformly on compacts to a same Lips-
chitz continuous function U when the mesh of the partition πn tends to 0. Moreover, the function
U is the unique dual viscosity solution of the HJI equation (3.53).
Now we only prove the convergence of (W¯ π(t, x, p, q), V¯ π(t, x, p, q)) and the proof of (W¯ π
(t, x, p, q), V¯ π(t, x, p, q)) is similar.
Notice that for any fixed β ∈ B(t, T ), there exists some partition π¯ such that β ∈ Bπ¯(t, T ).
Using this technique and the method which have been used in Section 3, we have the following
lemmas.
Lemma 5.1. The functions W¯ π and V¯ π are Lipschitz continuous with respect to (t, x, p, q), uni-
formly with respect to π.
Lemma 5.2. For any (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]×Rn, the functions W¯ π(t, x, p, q) and V¯ π(t, x, p, q) are convex
in p and concave in q on ∆(I)×∆(J), respectively.
Lemma 5.3. For all (t, x, p¯, q) ∈ [0, T ]× Rn × RI ×∆(J), we have
V¯ π∗(t, x, p¯, q) = inf
(βj)∈(B(t,T ))J
sup
α∈Aπ0 (t,T )
max
i∈{1,...,I}
{p¯i −
J∑
j=1
qjE[gij(X
t,x,α,βj
T )]}. (5.8)
Proof. Define V¯ π∗1 (t, x, p¯, q) = inf(βj)∈(B(t,T ))J supα∈Aπ0 (t,T )maxi∈{1,...,I}{p¯i−
∑J
j=1 qjE[gij(X
t,x,α,βj
T )]}.
Similar to the proof of Lemma 3.4, we have
V¯ π∗(t, x, p¯, q) = inf
(βj)∈(B(t,T ))J
sup
α∈Aπ(t,T )
max
i∈{1,...,I}
{p¯i −
J∑
j=1
qjE[gij(X
t,x,α,βj
T )]}. (5.9)
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SinceAπ0 (t, T ) ⊂ Aπ(t, T ), we have V¯ π∗1 (t, x, p¯, q) ≤ V¯ π∗(t, x, p¯, q). Now we prove the V¯ π∗1 (t, x, p¯, q) ≥
V¯ π∗(t, x, p¯, q). For any α ∈ Aπ(t, T ) , for any y = (y1, y2, ..., y2(N−k)−1) ∈ R2(N−k)−1, it holds
α(y, ·) ∈ Aπ0 (t, T ). For any (βj) ∈ (B(t, T ))J , we have the following inequalities
sup
α∈Aπ(t,T )
max
i∈{1,...,I}
{p¯i −
J∑
j=1
qjE[gij(X
t,x,α,βj
T )]}
≤ sup
α∈Aπ(t,T )
∫
[0,1]2(N−k)−1
max
i∈{1,...,I}
{p¯i −
J∑
j=1
qjE[gij(X
t,x,α((y1,y2,...,y2(N−k)−1),·),βj
T )]}dy1...dy2(N−k)−1
≤ sup
α∈Aπ0 (t,T )
sup
y∈[0,1]2(N−k)−1
max
i∈{1,...,I}
{p¯i −
J∑
j=1
qjE[gij(X
t,x,α((y1,y2,...,y2(N−k)−1),·),βj
T )]}
≤ sup
α∈Aπ0 (t,T )
max
i∈{1,...,I}
{p¯i −
J∑
j=1
qjE[gij(X
t,x,α,βj
T )]}.
(5.10)
Then taking infimum over (βj) ∈ (B(t, T ))J on both side we get the desired result.
Lemma 5.4. For all the partition π of the interval [0, T ], the convex conjugate function V¯ π∗(t, x, p¯, q)
is Lipschitz with respect to (t, x, p¯, q), the concave conjugate function W¯ π#(t, x, p, q¯) is Lipschitz with
respect to (t, x, p, q¯).
Lemma 5.5. For any (t, x, p¯, q) ∈ [tk−1, tk)×Rn ×RI ×∆(J), and for all l (k ≤ l ≤ N), we have
V¯ π∗(t, x, p¯, q) ≤ inf
β∈B(t,tl)
sup
α∈Aπ0 (t,tl)
E[V¯ π∗(tl,X
t,x,α,β
tl
, p¯, q)]
≤ inf
β∈B(t,tl)
sup
α∈Aπ(t,tl)
E[V¯ π∗(tl,X
t,x,α,β
tl
, p¯, q)].
(5.11)
For the proof of this lemma, we give the following remarks.
Remark 5.2. The proof of the first inequality is similar to Lemma 3.6 with the help of Lemma
5.3 and one should be noticed that α ∈ Aπ0 (t, tl) means α is a deterministic strategy. The second
inequality is obviously since Aπ0 (t, tl) ⊂ Aπ(t, tl).
Lemma 5.6. There exists a subsequence of partitions (πn)n≥1, still denoted by (πn)n≥1, and two
functions V˜ : [0, T ] × Rn × RI × ∆(J) 7→ R and W˜ : [0, T ] × Rn × ∆(I) × RJ 7→ R such that
(V¯ πn∗, W¯ πn#)→ (V˜ , W˜ ) uniformly on compacts in [0, T ]×Rn×∆(I)×∆(J)×RI×RJ . Furthermore,
the functions V˜ and W˜ are Lipschitz continuous with respect to all their variables.
Lemma 5.7. The limit function V˜ (t, x, p¯, q) is a viscosity subsolution of the same HJI equation
(3.38).
Notice that
− W¯ π(t, x, p, q) = sup
(αi)∈(Aπ(t,T ))I
inf
(βj)∈(B(t,T ))J
I∑
i=1
J∑
j=1
piqjE[−gij(Xt,x,αi,βjT )]. (5.12)
Hence, the convex conjugate of (−W¯ π) with respect to q, i.e., −(W¯ π#(t, x, p,−q¯)) satisfying a
sub-dynamic programming principle. Then, we have the following lemma.
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Lemma 5.8. For any (t, x, p, q¯) ∈ [tk−1, tk)×Rn ×∆(I)×RJ , and for all l (k ≤ l ≤ N), we have
W¯ π#(t, x, p, q¯) ≥ sup
α∈Aπ(t,tl)
inf
β∈B(t,tl)
E[W¯ π#(tl,X
t,x,α,β
tl
, p, q¯)]. (5.13)
Proposition 5.1. The limit function W˜ (t, x, p, q¯) is a viscosity supersolution of the same HJI
equation (3.38) under the condition (5.5).
Proof. For simplicity, we denote W˜ (t, x, p, q¯) by W˜ (t, x), for fixed (p, q¯) ∈ ∆(I) × RJ . For any
fixed (t, x) ∈ [0, T ] × Rn, since the coefficient f is bounded, there is some M > 0 such that,
B¯M (x) ⊃ {Xs,y,α,βr , (s, y) ∈ [0, T ]× B¯1(x), (α, β) ∈ Aπ(s, T )× B(s, T ), r ∈ [s, T ]}, where B¯M (x) is
the closed ball with the center x and the radius M . From Lemma 5.6, we know W¯ πn# converge to
W˜ over [0, T ] × B¯M (x). Let ϕ ∈ C1b ([0, T ] × Rn) be a test function such that
(−W˜ − (−ϕ))(t, x) > (−W˜ − (−ϕ))(s, y), for all (s, y) ∈ [0, T ]× B¯M (x) \ {(t, x)}. (5.14)
Let (sn, xn) ∈ [0, T ]× B¯M (x) be the maximum point of −W¯ πn# − (−ϕ) over [0, T ]× B¯M (x), then
there exists a subsequence of (sn, xn) still denoted by (sn, xn), such that (sn, xn) converges to (t, x).
Indeed, since [0, T ] × B¯M (x) is a compact set, there exists a subsequence (sn, xn) and (s¯, x¯) ∈
[0, T ]×B¯M (x) such that (sn, xn)→ (s¯, x¯). Due to (−W¯ πn#−(−ϕ))(sn, xn) ≥ (−W¯ πn#−(−ϕ))(t, x),
for n ≥ 1, we have
(−W˜ − (−ϕ))(s¯, x¯) ≥ (−W˜ − (−ϕ))(t, x). (5.15)
From (5.14) and (5.15), we have (s¯, x¯) = (t, x).
For the partition πn, we assume t
n
kn−1
≤ sn < tnkn , for simplicity, we write tnk−1 ≤ sn < tnk . Since
xn → x, there is a positive integer N such that for all n ≥ N , we have |xn − x| ≤ 1. Then from
Lemma 5.8, we get
−ϕ(sn, xn) = −W¯ πn#(sn, xn) ≤ inf
α∈Aπn (sn,tnk )
sup
β∈B(sn,tnk )
E[−W¯ πn#(tnk ,Xsn,xn,α,βtnk )]
≤ inf
α∈Aπn (sn,tnk )
sup
β∈B(sn,tnk )
E[−ϕ(tnk ,Xsn,xn,α,βtnk )].
(5.16)
Thus we get
0 ≤ inf
α∈Aπn (sn,tnk )
sup
β∈B(sn,tnk )
E[−ϕ(tnk ,Xsn,xn,α,βtnk )− (−ϕ(sn, xn))]
= inf
α∈Aπn (sn,tnk )
sup
β∈B(sn,tnk )
E[−
∫ tn
k
sn
(
∂ϕ
∂r
(r,Xsn,xn,α,βr ) + f(X
sn,xn,α,β
r , αr, βr) ·Dϕ(r,Xsn,xn,α,βr ))dr].
(5.17)
For (u, v) ∈ Ut,T × Vt,T , we introduce the following continuity modulus,
m(δ) := sup
|r − s| + |y − x¯| ≤ δ,
u ∈ U, v ∈ V, x¯, y ∈ B¯M (x)
∣∣(∂ϕ
∂r
(r, y) + f(y, u, v) ·Dϕ(r, y))− (∂ϕ
∂r
(s, x¯) + f(x¯, u, v) ·Dϕ(s, x¯))∣∣.
(5.18)
Obviously, m(δ) is nondecreasing in δ and m(δ) → 0, as δ ↓ 0. From (2.2), considering that
|Xsn,xn,α,βr − xn| ≤ C|r − sn| ≤ C|tnk − sn|, r ∈ [sn, tnk ] and from (5.18) we know that
|(∂ϕ
∂r
(r,Xsn,xn,α,βr ) + f(X
sn,xn,α,β
r , αr, βr) ·Dϕ(r,Xsn,xn,α,βr ))−
(∂ϕ
∂r
(sn, xn) + f(xn, αr, βr) ·Dϕ(sn, xn))| ≤ m(C|tnk − sn|), r ∈ [sn, tnk ].
(5.19)
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It follows from (5.17) and (5.19) that
− (tnk − sn)
(− ∂ϕ
∂r
(sn, xn) +m(C|tnk − sn|)
)
≤ inf
α∈Aπn (sn,tnk )
sup
β∈B(sn,tnk )
E[
∫ tnk
sn
(−f)(xn, αr, βr) ·Dϕ(sn, xn)dr]
≤ sup
β∈B(sn,tnk )
E[
∫ tnk
sn
(−f)(xn, α˜r, βr) ·Dϕ(sn, xn)dr],
(5.20)
where we take α˜r = u˜k, r ∈ [t, tnk ], u˜k ∈ U . Define ρn = (tnk − sn)2, then from (5.20) there exists a
ρn-optimal strategy β
n ∈ B(sn, tnk) (depending on α˜r) such that
−(tnk−sn)
(−∂ϕ
∂r
(sn, xn)+m(C|tnk−sn|)+(tnk−sn)
) ≤ E[∫ tnk
sn
(−f)(xn, α˜r, βnr )·Dϕ(sn, xn)dr]. (5.21)
Since βn ∈ B(sn, tnk) there is some partition π0, such that βn ∈ Bπ
0
(sn, t
n
k), without loss of generality,
π0 ⊃ πn. Assume {sn = θ0 < θ1 < . . . < θm = tnk} ⊂ π0. Therefore,
E[
∫ tnk
sn
(−f)(xn, α˜r, βρr ) ·Dϕ(sn, xn)dr] =
m∑
l=1
∫ θl
θl−1
E[(−f)(xn, α˜r, βρr ) ·Dϕ(sn, xn)]dr, (5.22)
where βρ depends on (ζπ
0
2,1, . . . , ζ
π0
2,l−1) on [θl−1, θl]. Then for r ∈ [θl−1, θl], we have,
E[(−f)(xn, α˜r, βρr ) ·Dϕ(sn, xn)] = E[(−f)(xn, u˜k, βρr (ζπ
0
2,1, . . . , ζ
π0
2,l−1)) ·Dϕ(sn, xn)]
=
∫
V
(−f)(xn, u˜k, v) ·Dϕ(sn, xn)Pβρr (ζπ02,1,...,ζπ02,l−1)(dv) ≤ supν∈P(V )
∫
V
(−f)(xn, u˜k, v) ·Dϕ(sn, xn)ν(dv).
(5.23)
W e define I(u˜k) := supν∈P(V )
∫
V
(−f)(xn, u˜k, v) ·Dϕ(sn, xn)ν(dv), from the arbitrariness of u˜k, we
can choose u˜k := u
∗, such that I(u∗) = min
u˜k∈U
I(u˜k). Then, for all u ∈ U , from (5.23), we have
∫ θl
θl−1
I(u˜k)dr =
∫ θl
θl−1
I(u∗)dr ≤
∫ θl
θl−1
sup
ν∈P(V )
∫
V
(−f)(xn, u, v) ·Dϕ(sn, xn)dν(v)dr. (5.24)
From (5.24) and the condition (5.5) we obtain∫ θl
θl−1
I(u˜k)dr ≤(θl − θl−1) inf
u∈U
sup
ν∈P(V )
∫
V
(−f)(xn, u, v) ·Dϕ(sn, xn)dν(v)
=(θl − θl−1) sup
ν∈P(V )
inf
u∈U
∫
V
(−f)(xn, u, v) ·Dϕ(sn, xn)dν(v)
=(θl − θl−1) sup
ν∈P(V )
inf
µ∈P(U)
∫
U×V
(−f)(xn, u, v) ·Dϕ(sn, xn)dµ(u)dν(v).
(5.25)
From (5.21), (5.22), (5.23) and (5.25), we have
− (tnk − sn)
(− ∂ϕ
∂r
(sn, xn) +m(C|tnk − sn|) + (tnk − sn)
)
≤(tnk − sn) sup
ν∈P(V )
inf
µ∈P(U)
∫
U×V
(−f)(xn, u, v) ·Dϕ(sn, xn)µ(du)ν(dv).
(5.26)
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Then we have
∂ϕ
∂r
(sn, xn)−m(C|tnk−sn|)− (tnk −sn)
) ≤ sup
ν∈P(V )
inf
µ∈P(U)
∫
U×V
(−f)(xn, u, v) ·Dϕ(sn, xn)µ(du)ν(dv).
(5.27)
Recall that (sn, xn)→ (t, x) and 0 ≤ (tnk − sn) ≤ (tnk − tnk−1) ≤ |πn|, when n→∞ we get
∂ϕ
∂t
(t, x) + inf
ν∈P(V )
sup
µ∈P(U)
∫
U×V
f(x, u, v) ·Dϕ(t, x)µ(du)ν(dv) ≤ 0. (5.28)
Therefore, W˜ (t, x, p, q¯) is a viscosity supersolution of the HJI equation (3.38).
Similar to Section 3 (Proposition 3.1 and Theorem 3.2), we have the following results.
Proposition 5.2. If condition (5.5) holds, then for all sequences of partitions (πn) of the interval
[0, T ] with |πn| → 0, as n → ∞, there exists a subsequence of partitions, still denoted by (πn)n≥1
such that (V¯ πn) and (W¯ πn) converges uniformly on compacts to a couple (U,U), and the function
U is the unique dual solution of the HJI equation (3.53).
Theorem 5.2. Suppose condition (5.5) holds, then for all sequences of partitions (πn) with |πn| →
0, the sequences (V¯ πn) and (W¯ πn) converge uniformly on compacts to the same Lipschitz continuous
function U . Moreover, the function U is the unique dual solution of the HJI equation (3.53).
Similar to (W¯ πn , V¯ πn), we obtain the following theorem.
Theorem 5.3. Suppose condition (5.6) holds, then for all sequences of partitions (πn) with |πn| →
0, the sequences (V¯ πn) and (W¯ πn) converge uniformly on compacts to the same Lipschitz continuous
function U . Moreover, the function U is the unique dual solution of the HJI equation (3.53).
Now from Theorem 5.1, Theorem 5.2 and Theorem 5.3, we get the following result.
Theorem 5.4. Under the conditions (5.5) and (5.6), the functionW (t, x, p, q) is equal to V (t, x, p, q),
for all compacts in [0, T ]× Rn ×∆(I)×∆(J).
Proof. We have shown that the value functionsW π(t, x, p, q), V π(t, x, p, q), W¯ π(t, x, p, q), V¯ π(t, x, p, q),
W¯ π(t, x, p, q), V¯ π(t, x, p, q) converges uniformly on compacts to the function U(t, x, p, q), as |π| → 0,
under the assumptions (5.5) and (5.6), where the function U(t, x, p, q) is the unique solution of the
HJI equation (3.53).
Then, from the definition of W (t, x, p, q), for any ε > 0, there exist αˆε ∈ (A(t, T ))I , such that
ε+W (t, x, p, q) ≥ sup
βˆ∈(B(t,T ))J
J(t, x, αˆε, βˆ, p, q). (5.29)
For αˆε ∈ (A(t, T ))I , there exist a partition πε, such that αˆε ∈ (Aπε(t, T ))I ⊂ (Aπ(t, T ))I , for
π ⊃ πε. Thus for all π ⊃ πε, it holds that
ε+W (t, x, p, q) ≥ sup
βˆ∈(Bπ(t,T ))J
J(t, x, αˆε, βˆ, p, q) ≥W π(t, x, p, q). (5.30)
From the arbitrariness of ε, we have W (t, x, p, q) ≥W π(t, x, p, q), then let |π| → 0, we have
W (t, x, p, q) ≥ U(t, x, p, q). (5.31)
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Similarly, we have
U(t, x, p, q) ≥ V (t, x, p, q). (5.32)
On the other hand, since W (t, x, p, q) ≤ inf
αˆ∈(Aπ(t,T ))I
sup
βˆ∈(B(t,T ))J
J(t, x, αˆ, βˆ, p, q) = W¯ π(t, x, p, q),
let |π| → 0, we have
W (t, x, p, q) ≤ U(t, x, p, q). (5.33)
Similarly, since V (t, x, p, q) ≥ V¯ π(t, x, p, q), let |π| → 0, we have
V (t, x, p, q) ≥ U(t, x, p, q). (5.34)
Now from (5.31), (5.32), (5.33) and (5.34), we get W (t, x, p, q) = U(t, x, p, q) = V (t, x, p, q).
Now we give a example to explain that the conditions (5.5) and (5.6) are necessary even for the
games with symmetric information.
Example 5.1. We assume U = V = [−1, 1], I = J = 1, g(x) = x, f(x, u, v) = |u− v|2. For any
given (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× Rn, the dynamic is
Xs = x+
∫ s
t
|us − vs|2ds, s ∈ [t, T ].
The payoffs
J(t, x, α, β) = E[g(Xt,x,α,βT )] = E[X
t,x,α,β
T ].
From Remark 2.1, we know there exists the unique (u, v) ∈ Ut,T×Vt,T , such that α(v) = u, β(u) = v,
then we have
J(t, x, α, β) = x+ E[
∫ T
t
|αr − βr|2dr]. (5.35)
For any x ∈ R, (u, v) ∈ U×V , p ∈ R, the Hamiltonian function H(x, u, v, p) = |u−v|2p. Moreover,
we define
H˜+(x, p) , inf
u∈U
sup
v∈V
H(x, u, v, p) = inf
u∈U
(1 + |u|)2p+ = p+;
H˜−(x, p) , sup
v∈V
inf
u∈U
H(x, u, v, p) = sup
v∈V
(− (1 + |v|)2p−) = −p−.
Obviously, for any p 6= 0, H˜−(x, p) = −p− < p+ = H˜+(x, p). For the measure-valued con-
trols µ ∈ P(U), ν ∈ P(V ) and (x, p) ∈ R2, the Hamiltonian function H(x, µ, ν, p) = ∫
U
∫
V
|u −
v|2pν(dv)µ(du). We define
H+(x, p) = inf
µ∈P(U)
sup
ν∈P(V )
H(x, µ, ν, p); H−(x, p) = sup
ν∈P(V )
inf
µ∈P(U)
H(x, µ, ν, p).
Then we know H(x, p) := H+(x, p) = H−(x, p). Now we compute H−(x, p). For the case p ≥ 0,
since
H(x, µ, ν, p) =
∫
V
∫
U
|u− v|2pµ(du)ν(dv)
=
∫
V
∫
U
(|v − ∫
V
vν(dv)|2 + |u−
∫
V
vν(dv)|2)pµ(du)ν(dv)
≥
∫
V
|v −
∫
V
vν(dv)|2pν(dv) = H(x, δ∫
V
vν(dv), ν, p),
(5.36)
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we know infµ∈P(U)H(x, µ, ν, p) = H(x, δ∫
V
vν(dv), ν, p) =
( ∫
V
|v − ∫
V
vν(dv)|2ν(dv))p. Therefore,
H−(x, p) = supν∈P(V )(
∫
V
|v − ∫
V
vν(dv)|2ν(dv))p = supν∈P(V )
( ∫
V
v2ν(dv) − (∫
V
vν(dv))2
)
p ≤ p,
and when ν = 12(δ1 + δ−1) it attains the maximum value.
For the case p < 0, H−(x, p) = −
(
infν∈P(V ) supµ∈P(U)
∫
U
∫
V
|u−v|2µ(du)ν(dv)(−p)
)
= −(−p)+ =
p. Thus, we get H(x, p) = H−(x, p) = p.
The corresponding HJI equation is as follows:{
∂tV +H(x, ∂xV ) = 0,
V (T, x) = g(x) = x.
(5.37)
Notice that V (t, x) = x+ T − t, t ∈ [0, T ], x ∈ R is the solution of this equation.
If both players use the same partition π, as |π| → 0, from Theorem 3.2 we have (W π(t, x), V π(t, x))
converge to the same function V (t, x). If not, for example, we calculate
W¯ π(t, x) = inf
α∈Aπ(t,T )
sup
β∈B(t,T )
E[g(Xt,x,α,βT )].
For Player I, we assume the partition π = {0 = t0 < t1 < · · · < tN = T}, t ∈ [tk−1, tk), without
loss of generality, we assume t = tk−1 and αr = αk(ζπ1,k−1)r, r ∈ [tk, tk+1].
For Player II, we consider the partition πn = {0 = (t0 =)S0 < S1 < . . . < S2n(= t1) < S2n+1 <
. . . < S2n+2n(= t2) < . . . < S(l−1)2n+j < . . . < S(N−1)2n+2n(= tN ) = T}, where S(l−1)2n+j = tl−1 +
j(tl−tl−1)2−n, 0 ≤ j ≤ 2n, 1 ≤ l ≤ N. On the subinterval ∆l,nm := [S(l−1)2n+m−1, S(l−1)2n+m], Player
II uses the strategy βr = βS(l−1)2n+m(ζ
πn
2,(l−1)2n+m−1, α|[t,S(l−1)2n+m−1])r, 1 ≤ m ≤ 2n, k ≤ l ≤ N.
Obviously, βr(u) , ur−|πn| satisfy the above situation.
Now let βr(u) ,
{ − sgn(ur−|πn|), r ∈ [t+ |πn|, T ],
0, r ∈ [t, t+ |πn|], and from the equation (5.35), we get
J(t, x, α, β) = x+
∫ t+|πn|
t
E[|αr|2]dr + E[
∫ T
t+|πn|
|αr + sgn(αr−πn)|2dr]
= x+E[
∫ T
t
|αr + sgn(αr)|2dr] +Rn = x+E[
∫ T
t
(1 + |αr|)2dr] +Rn,
(5.38)
where Rn =
∫ t+|πn|
t
E[|αr|2]dr−
∫ t+|πn|
t
E[|αr+sgn(αr−|πn|)|2]dr+E[
∫ T
t
(|αr+sgn(αr−|πn|)|2−|αr+
sgn(αr)|2)dr] ≤ |πn|+4|πn|+4E[
∫ T
t
| sgn(αr)− sgn(αr−|πn|)|dr]. Now we give the following lemma
to explain Rn → 0, as n→ 0.
Lemma 5.9. For all u ∈ L2([0, T ]), it holds limε→0
∫ T
0 |us − us−ε|2ds = 0.
Proof. For any fixed u ∈ L2([0, T ]), since C1([0, T ]) is dense in L2([0, T ]), for all ρ > 0, there exists
uρ ∈ C1([0, T ]), such that (∫ T0 |us − uρs|2ds) 12 ≤ ρ. Then, we have
(
∫ T
0 |us − us−ε|2ds)
1
2 ≤ Cρ+ C(∫ T0 |uρs − uρs−ε|2ds) 12 ≤ Cρ+ Cε√T → 0, when ε and ρ→ 0.
From this lemma we know that when n→∞, Rn → 0. Thus, from our choice of β ∈ Bπn(t, T )
and the equation (5.38) we have
J(t, x, α, β) = x+ E[
∫ T
t
(1 + |αr|)2dr] +Rn, and Rn → 0, as n→∞. (5.39)
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On the other hand, for any β ∈ B(t, T ) , ∪π′⊃πBπ′(t, T ), we have
J(t, x, α, β) = x+E[
∫ T
t
|αr − βr|2dr] ≤ x+ E[
∫ T
t
(1 + |αr|)2dr]. (5.40)
From (5.39) and (5.40), we have supβ∈B(t,T ) J(t, x, α, β) = x+ E[
∫ T
t
(1 + |αr|)2dr]. Then
W¯ π(t, x) = inf
α∈Aπ(t,T )
sup
β∈B(t,T )
E[g(Xt,x,α,βT )] = x+ (T − t) = V (t, x). (5.41)
We assume π and πn as before, choose αr =
{
0, [t, t+ |πn|];
βr−|πn|, [t+ |πn|, T ];
, then we have J(t, x, α, β) =
x+ E[
∫ t+|πn|
t
|βr|2dr] + E[
∫ T
t+|πn| |βr − βr−πn |2dr], when n→∞, from Lemma 5.9, we have
inf
α∈A(t,T )
E[g(Xt,x,α,βT )] = x.
Then, we know
V¯ π(t, x) = sup
β∈Bπ(t,T )
inf
α∈A(t,T )
E[g(Xt,x,α,βT )] = x. (5.42)
Using the same argument we have
W (t, x) = inf
α∈A(t,T )
sup
β∈B(t,T )
E[g(Xt,x,α,βT )] = x+ (T − t);
V (t, x) = sup
β∈B(t,T )
inf
α∈A(t,T )
E[g(Xt,x,α,βT )] = x.
(5.43)
Obviously, the upper value function W (t, x) is not equal to the lower value function V (t, x) if we
do not consider the conditions (5.5) and (5.6).
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